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The Murky Future of the Clean Water
Act after SWANCC: Using a
Hydrological Connection Approach to
Saving the Clean Water Act
Bradford C. Mank'

In 2001, the Supreme Court decided Solid Waste Agency of Northern
Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC). In
this five-to-four decision, the Court held that the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (Corps) lacked the authority under the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act (FWPCA) to regulate "isolated" intrastate wetlands and
waters that serve as habitat for migratory birds. The Court found the
FWPCA's jurisdiction is limited to navigable waters and non-navigable
waters that have a "significant nexus" to navigable waters, such as wetlands
adjacent to navigable waters. However, the Court did not clearly define
which adjacent wetlands and tributaries are within the scope of the
FWPCA, generating considerable uncertainty about the FWPCA's
jurisdiction. Some courts and commentators read SWANCC broadly to
limit the FWPCA's application to only navigable waters and non-navigable
wetlands and tributaries that immediately abut navigable waters. Other
courts read SWANCC narrowly to mean that the FWPCA does not reach
isolated, non-navigable waters that have no connection to navigable waters,
but that its jurisdiction does reach inland waters or wetlands that have any
hydrological or ecological connection to navigable waters. This Article
proposes an intermediate position that requires that non-navigable waters
contribute more than a mere hydrological connection or drop of water to
navigable water to come within the FWPCA's jurisdiction, but also rejects
the view that adjacent wetlands and tributaries must directly abut navigable
waters to constitute "waters of the United States." The Article concludes
that courts should interpret the Act to include any non-navigable waters,
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INTRODucnON

In 2001, the Supreme Court murkied the already clouded
understanding of the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWCPA
or "the Act"Y with its five-to-four decision in Solid Waste Agency of
Northern Cook County (SWANCC) v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers2. The Court held that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(Corps) lacked authority under the FWPCA to regulate wetlands and
waters that serve as habitat for migratory birds when those waters are
both isolated and intrastate. 3 According to the SWANCC Court,
Congress intended that the FWPCA's jurisdiction be limited to navigable
waters and non-navigable waters that have a "significant nexus" to
navigable waters, such as wetlands adjacent to navigable waters. 4 The
Court emphasized that, despite precedent diminishing the importance of
navigability,

1. See generally Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2003)
(commonly known as the "Clean Water Act").
2. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng'gs, 531
U.S. 159 (2001) [hereinafter SWANCC). Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion,
joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas. [d. at 161. Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented. ld.
3. See SWANCC, supra note 2, at 171-74 (invalidating Final Rule for Regulatory
Programs for the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41206,41217 (Nov. 13, 1986»; William Funk,
The Court, the Clean Water Act, and the Constitution: SWANCC and Beyond, 31 ENVTL. L. REP.
10741 (2001); Stephen M. Johnson, Federal Regulation of Isolated Wetlands After SW ANCC, 31
ENVTL. L. REP. 10669 (2001).
4. SWANCC, supra note 2, at 167-68 (explaining the Court's prior decision in United
Slates v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121 (1985), by observing that a "significant nexus"
existed between adjacent wetlands and navigable waters).
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it is one thing to give a word limited effect and quite another to give it
no effect whatever. The term 'navigable' has at least the import of
showing us what Congress had in mind as its authority for enacting
the [FWPCA]: its traditional jurisdiction over waters that were or had
been navigable in fact or which could reasonably be so made. 5
Although SWANCC specifically addressed the ability of the Corps to
regulate isolated, intrastate wetlands, the decision has broad implications
for governmental regulation of water pollution. Because the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) shares overlapping
responsibilities with the Corps over wetlands regulation and has exclusive
jurisdiction over other areas of the FWPCA,6 the SWANCC decision may
also affect the EPA's approach to wetlands regulation and specifically its
authority to issue permits for isolated waters.? However, the Court did
not clearly define which adjacent wetlands and tributaries are within the
scope of the FWPCA, thereby generating considerable uncertainty about
the FWPCA's jurisdiction.
On January 19, 2001, the last full day of the Clinton administration,
the EPA and the Corps [hereinafter "the agencies"] issued a joint
memorandum written by Gary S. Guzy, General Counsel of the EPA,
and Robert M. Andersen, Chief Counsel of the Corps, adopting the
narrow interpretation that SWANCC invalidates the agencies' authority
only over waters in which their jurisdiction was based solely on the
presence of migratory birds. 8 In light of SWANCC's broader dicta
5. SWANCC, supra note 2, at 172 (citing United States v. Appalachian EJee. Power Co..
311 U.S. 377, 407"'{)8 (1940».
6. Tn its Advance Notice of Proposed Rule Making (ANPRM), the EPA and the Corps
summarized their jurisdiction under the FWPCA as follows:
The [FWPCA] generally prohibits the discharge of pollutants into 'waters of the U.S.'
without a permit issued by EPA or a State or Tribe approved by EPA under § 402 of
tbe Act, or, in the case of dredged or fill material, by the Corps or an approved State
or Tribe under § 404 of the Act.
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition of
Waters of the United States, 68 Fed. Reg. 1991, 1991-92 (Jan. 15, 2003) [hereinafter ANPRM].
The EPA has authority to veto section 404 permits issued by the Corps, or an approved State or
Tribe. In a footnote, the SWANCC Court stated: "The EPA is the agency that generally
administers the [FWPCA]. except as otherwise provided. 33 U.s.c. § 1251 (d): see also 43 Op.
Atty. Gen. 197 (1979) (,Congress intended to confer upon the administrator of the [EPA] the
final administrative authority' to determine the reach of the term 'navigable waters')."
SWANCC, supra note 2, at 184 n.lD.
7. See Susan Bruninga, EPA, Army Corps Say Definition of 'Waters' May Affect Other
Clean
Water Acl Programs, 34 BNA ENV'T REP. 139 (2003); infra notes 301, 305 and accompanying
text.
8. Memorandum from Gary S. Guzy and Robert M. Andersen, Supreme Court Ruling
Concerning CW A Jurisdiction over Isolated Waters 2-3 (Jan. 19, 2001), available at
http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/swanccnav.html(online Edocket for the ANPRM, document
no. OW-2002-0050-0003); Virginia S. Albrecht & Stephen M. Nickelsburg, Could SWANCC Be
Right? A New Look at the Legislalive HislOry of the Clean Water Act, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 11042,
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concerning the primacy of navigation in determining the Act's
jurisdiction, advocates of property rights and many Republican members
of Congress have lobbied the agencies to revise the Guzy-Anderson joint
guidance on wetlands and issue a rule limiting the FWPCA's jurisdiction
to navigable waters, wetlands adjacent to navigable waters, and
tributaries to navigable waters. 9 Conversely, several leading
environmental groups and the Associations of State Wetland and
Floodplain Managers have argued that the agencies should not address
issues raised by SWANCC's dicta in a broad rule making, but should
instead issue a narrow guidance addressing which wetlands are affected
by the Court's rejection of the Migratory Bird "Rule."lo
11042-43 (2002) (discussing joint EPA and Corps memorandum on FWPCA jurisdiction);
Jeanne A. Calderon, The SW ANCC Decision and the Future of Federal, State and Local
Regulation of Wetlands, 30 REAL EST. L.J. 303, 304, 315 (2002) (same).
9. See, e.g., Federal Authority to Require Wetlands Dumping Permits: Hearing on Agency
Implementation of Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps
of Engineers Before the Subcomm. on Energy Policy, Natural Res. & Regulatory Affairs, HOllse
Comm. on Gov't Reform, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. (2002) (statement of Doug Ose, Chairman,
Subcomm. on Energy Policy, Natural Res. & Regulatory Affairs, House Comm. on Gov't
Reform), available at 2002 WL 100237579 (arguing SWANCCs rationale requires EPA and
Corps to issue rule limiting Clean Water Act jurisdiction to navigable waters, and immediately
abutting wetlands and tributaries): id., at 2(02 WL 100237583 (statement of M. Reed Hopper,
Principal Attorney, Pacific Legal Foundatioll); id., at 2002 WL 100237584 (statement of Nancie
G. Marzulla, President, Defenders of Property Rights); id., at 2002 WL 100237585 (statement of
Raymond Stevens Smethurst, Jr., Partner, Adkins, Potts and Smethurst).
10. See, e.g., Hearing on Clean Water Act Before Senate Comm. on Environment & Public
Works, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. (2002) (statcment of Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., Senior Counsel,
Natural Resources Defense Council), available at 2002 WL 100237903 [hereinafter Kennedy
Testimony]; Federal Authority to Require Wetlands Dumping Permits: Hearing on Agency
Implementation of Solid Waste Agenc.y of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps
of Engineers Before the Subcomm. all Energy Policy, Natural Res. & Regulatory Affairs, House
Comm. on Gov't Reform, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. (2002) (statement of Gary S. Guzy, Partner,
Foley Hoag, LLP), available at 2002 WL 100237586 [hereinafter Guzy Testimony]; Federal
Allthority to Require Wetlands Dumping Permits: Hearing on Agency Implementation of Solid
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers Before the
Subcomm. on Energy Policy, Natural Res. & RegulaTOry Affairs, House Comm. on GOV't Reform,
107th Cong., 2d Sess. (2002) (statement of Patrick Parenteau, Professor of Law, Vermont Law
School), available at 2002 WL 100237587 [hereinafter Parenteau Testimony]; Joe Truini,
Supreme COLlrt's ruling muddies water regulations, WASTE NEWS, Sept. 30, 2002, at 1 (reporting
criticisms of Joan Mulhern, legislative counsel for Earthjustice, of EPA's planned rule making on
FWPCA jUrisdiction); Editorial, The Clean Water Act at 30, N.Y. TIMES, Oct 22,2002, at A30
(arguing Bush administration should not narrow jurisdiction of FWPCA); Letter from Jeanne
Christie, Executive Director, Association of State Wetland Managers and Larry Larson,
Executive Director, Association of State Floodplain Managers to Christine Todd Whitman,
Administrator, United States Environmental Protection Agency, et aJ. (Dated Oct. 4, 2002)
("We urge the [Bush] administration not to proceed with rulemaking in an attempt to limit the
scope of the [FWPCA].") (on file with author); Lctter from Clean Water Action; Defenders of
Wildlife; Earthjustice; Friends of the Earth; National Wildlife Federation; Natural Resources
Defense Council and Sierra Club to Dominic Izzo, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the
Army for Civil Works, United States Army Corps of Engineers and Christine Todd Whitman.
Administrator, United States Environmental Protection Agency, et. aJ., (dated Oct. 4, 2002)
("We respectfully urge the [Bush] administration to issue policy gUidance consistent with the
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Environmentalists argue that the Act's legislative history, the agencies'
regulations, and prior judicial decisions clearly establish that the term
"waters of the United States" that describes jurisdiction in the Act should
be given the broadest possible interpretation permissible pursuant to
Congress' authority under the Constitution'S Commerce Clause. l1
On January 10, 2003, the EPA and the Corps issued a joint press
release in which they announced their intention to publish an Advance
Notice of Proposed Rule Making (ANPRM) to solicit public comment to
clarify the extent of the Act's jurisdiction in light of SWANCC. 12 The
agencies also issued a joint memorandum, or guidance, on how field staff
should address jurisdictional issues until the agencies issue a final rule on
the subjectY On January 15, 2003, the agencies published the ANPRM in
the Federal Register and gave the public forty-five days to comment on
the impact of SWANCC on the agencies' jurisdiction. 14 The agencies also
published in the Federal Register the joint memorandum as Appendix A
to the ANPRMY After receiving over thirty thousand comments,16 the
agencies subsequently extended the comment period to April 16, 2003.17
The ANPRM and January 2003 guidance have provoked concerns
among environmentalists that approximately twenty percent of all
wetlands, totaling about twenty million acres, will be classified as
"isolated," and hence beyond federal jurisdictionY The guidance has not
made developers happy either; they seek clear rules defining which
wetlands are subject to regulation. 19 In response to the concerns of
environmentalists, Benjamin Grumbles, the EPA deputy assistant
administrator for water, responded that the Bush administration is

legal position of the Department of Justice and not to proceed with rulemaking in an attempt to
limit the scope of the [FWPCAj.") (on file with author).
11. See Bruninga, supra note 7, at 139; Guzy Testimony, supra note 10 (arguing SWANCC
was narrow decision leaving broad jurisdiction under FWPCA); Kennedy Testimony. supra note
10 (same); Parenteau Testimony, supra note 10 (same).
12. ANPRM, supra note 6.
13. See Press Release, EPA and Army Corps of Engineers, Administration to Reaffirm
Commitment to No Net Loss of Wetlands and Address Approach for Protecting Isolated Waters
in Light of Supreme Court Ruling on Jurisdictional Issues (Jan. 10. 2003), available at http://
www.epa.gov!owow!wetlandslPress-Logo.pdf;Bruninga;supranote7.at139; Susan Bruninga,
Jurisdiction Over Isolated Waters Clarified in Guidance Issued by EPA, Army Corps, 34 BNA
ENy'T REP. 140 (2003).
14. ANPRM, supra note 6.
15. Id. at 1995-98; infra notes 487,493-96 and accompanying text.
16. Ray A. Smith, New Guidelines Stir Debate on Wetlands, WALL ST. 1., Feb. 26, 20m, at
B8.
17. Extension of Comment Period, 68 Fed. Reg. 9613 (Feb. 28, 2003).
18. See, e.g., Matt Arado, How Bartlett's Balefill Case Sparked National Wetlands Debate,
CHI. DAILY HERALD, Mar. 17, 2003, at 1; Smith, supra note 16 (quoting Jeffrey R. Porter,
manager of environmental law section of Mintz Levin Cohn Ferris Glovsky & Popeo, stating
that, "Both sides are unhappy with the government['s guidelines.]").
19. Smith, supra note 16.
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committed to no net loss of wetlands,20 and that the agencies plan to
retain jurisdiction over most wetlands and may not even issue new
regula tions. 21
Several Democratic politicians, as well as some Republicans, have
argued against weakening the Act, and some commentators suggested
that the Bush administration would delay issuing a final rule until after
the 2004 elections.22 For example, in March 2003, the EPA spokesman,
John Millett, stated that the agencies might not issue new rules for two to
five years because of the difficulty in addressing the "gray area" of which
wetlands are isolated and thus ineligible for federal protection. 23 In
congressional testimony, Major General Robert H. Griffin, director of
civil works for the Corps, indicated that the substantial policy issues
required in re-defining the Corps' jurisdiction demand "a substantial
work effort that is expected to carry into 2004."24 On June 10, 2003,
despite pressure from conservative Republican senators requesting faster
action by the agencies in issuing a rule on the definition of wetlands
jurisdiction, G. Tracy Mehan, the EPA assistant administrator for water,
indicated that the Agency would not issue a rule until it had studied all
comments on the ANPRM-S,OOO individualized comments and 128,000
form comments; on December 16, 2003, the EPA and Corps announced
that the Bush Administration would not issue new regulations
substantially restricting the agencies' jurisdiction over wetlands, although
they also announced that their controversial January 2003 joint guidance
would remain in effect until such time as the agencies may later issue new
guidelines refining the Act's jurisdiction. 25
20. ld. (paraphrasing Grumbles).
21. See Press Release, EPA and Army Corps of Engineers, supra note 13; EPA Claims
Isolated Waters Plans Affirm Strong Agency Oversight, INSIDE EPA, January 22,2003.
22. See Environmentalists Seek '04 Democratic Focus on Bush Water Rule, INSIDE EPA,
March 19,2003; infra note 25 and accompanying text.
23. Arado, supra note 18.
24. See Hearing on Fiscal 2004 Appropriations Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Warer
Development, Comm on Senate Appropriations, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003) (testimony of
Major General Robert H. Griffin, Director of Civil Works for the Army Corps of Engineers).
25. Federal Jurisdiction of Navigable Waters Under Clean Waters: Hearing Before Senate
Comm. on Environment and Public Works 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003) (statement of G. Tracy
Mehan, Assistant Administrator of Water, EPA), available at 2003 WL 56335158; Susan
Bruninga, Ecology, Hydrology Should Determine Federal Role, EPA Official Says, 34 BNA
ENV'T REP. 1341 (2003) (reporting G. Tracy Mehan, EPA Assistant Administrator of Water,
testified before Senate Subcommittee that EPA and Corps would review over 128,000 comments
before revising agency rules on wetlands jurisdiction despite Republican Senator James Inhofe's
request for swifter action). On November 25, 2003, in response to a leaked draft document
indicating that the EPA and Corps planned to issue a draft rule narrowing jurisdiction over nonnavigable wetlands and waters, 218 members of the House of Representatives, including 26
Republicans, sent a letter to the Bush administration urging it not to issue any rule narrowing
the jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act. Elizabeth Shogren, Changes in Water Policy Opposed,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2003, at 12. James Connaughton, chairman of the Council on
Environmental Quality, responded that the Bush Administration was still reviewing comments
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As the agencies have begun to develop rules, the importance of the
SWANCC Court's broader dicta concerning the primacy of navigation in
determining the Act's jurisdiction has generated vigorous debate. Until
recently, the EPA and the Corps broadly construed the scope of federal
jurisdiction under the Acf 6 to reach the limits of Congress' constitutional
authority under the Commerce ClauseY In 1985, the Supreme Court in
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. 28 concluded that the Act
applied to non-navigable wetlands adjacent to navigable waters, stating
that the term "navigable" is of "limited import" and that Congress sought
"to exercise its powers under the Commerce Clause to regulate at least
some waters that would not be deemed 'navigable' under the classical
understanding of that term.,,29 In light of Riverside Bayview's broad dicta,
but not its actual holding, the Corps in 1986 issued a migratory bird
regulation that justified jurisdiction over non-navigable, isolated,
intrastate waters and wetlands that "are or would be used as habitat
by ... migratory birds which cross state lines" on the grounds that these
birds substantially affect interstate commerce?O It was this rule that the
Court overruled in SWANCC when the Corps based their assertion of
jurisdiction upon it.
Since 1977, the EPA and the Corps' regulations have broadly
defined the term "waters of the United States" to include "intrastate
lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats,
wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural
ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate

on the ANPRM and had not decided whether to issue a rule regarding federal jurisdiction under
the Clean Water Act. ld. On December 16,2003, just before this article was published, the EPA
announced it would not issue a rule restricting its jurisdiction over wetlands because most states
were opposed to narrowing federal jurisdiction and the majority of lower court decisions had
broadly interpreted the Act's jurisdiction. EPA. Press Release. EPA and Corps Issue Wetlands
Decision, EPA 03-R-291 (Dec. 16,2003), available at 2003 WL 22955590; Elizabeth Shogren,
Administration Backs Off Clean Water Act, L.A. TiMES, Dec. 17, 2003, at 22. Predictably,
environmentalists were pleased with the Bush Administration's decision not to issue new
regulations, although disappointed that the January 2003 guidelines will remain in effect, and
developers were disappointed that there will be no new rule. Id.
26. See Federal Authority to Require Wetlands Dumping Permits: Hearing un Agency
Implementation of Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v, United States Army Corps
of Engineers Before the Subcomm. on Energy Policy, Natural Res. & Regulatory Affairs, House
Comm. on Gov't Reform, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. (2002) (statement of Dominic lzzo, Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, Civil Works Dep't of the Army and Robert E.
Fabricant, General Counsel, EPA), available at 2002 WL 100237580; Truini, supra note 10, at 1
(reporting EPA's plans to update its regulations on FWPCA jurisdiction).
27. See infra notes 135, 141-46, 186-92 and accompanying text.
28. See 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
29. [d. at 133.
30. See Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers. 51 Fed. Reg. 41206,
41217 (Nov.13, 1986) (interpreting 33 C.F.R. § 328.3); infra notes 186-92.
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or foreign commerce .... "31 Before 2001, many lower court decisions
agreed that the Act's jurisdiction reached the limits of Congress'
authority to regulate interstate commerce.32 Additionally, there is strong
scientific support behind the agencies' efforts to regulate isolated,
intrastate wetlands. In 1995, in a major report prepared for the Corps, the
National Academy of Sciences concluded that the "scientific basis for
policies that attribute less importance to headwater areas and isolated
wetlands than to other wetlands is weak.,,33
In the 2001 SWANCC decision,34 the Supreme Court revitalized the
importance of navigability in determining the Act's jurisdiction and
raised questions about many decisions that extended the Act to nonnavigable waters. 35 SWANCC only specifically addressed the Migratory
Bird "Rule," thus the impact of SWANCC on the Act's jurisdiction in
other areas is unclear. Since the Court decided SWANCC, lower federal
courts have disagreed whether the decision is limited to its core holding
that the Migratory Bird "Rule" is invalid or whether the decision reflects
a broader principle that the Act is limited to regulation of navigable
waters and waters that have a close nexus to navigable waters. 36 A
minority of courts and some commentators read the SWANCC decision
broadly to limit the Act to only navigable waters and non-navigable
wetlands and tributaries that immediately abut or have a very close nexus
to navigable waters. 37 In Rice v. Harken Exploration Co./ 8 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated that "[ u ]nder

31. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (2003) (Corps regulation); 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s)(3) (2003)
(EPA regulation); Funk. supra note 3. at 10,741.
32. See, e.g., United States v. TGR Corp., 171 F.3d 762, 764-65 (2d Cir. 1999); United
States v. Eidson, 108 F.3d 1336, 1341-42 (11th Cir. 1997); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55
F.3d 1388, 1394-95 (9th Cir. 1995); Quivira Mining Co. v. EPA, 765 F.2d 126,129-30 (10th Cir.
1985); Robin Kundis Craig, Navigating Federalism: The Missing Statutory Analysis in Solid
Wastc Agency, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10508 & n.4, 10513-14 & n.80 (2001) (citing numerous preLopez cases holding FWPCA's jurisdiction reaches limits of congressional commerce power).
33. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, WETLANDS: CHARACTERISTICS AND BOUNDARIES
15h (1995); see (11.1'0 Changes to the Water Pollution Control Act: Hearing Before Senate Comm.
on Environment and Public Works 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997) (statement of Michael L. Davis,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army) (discussing conclusion of National Academy of
Sciences that isolated and headwaters wetlands deserve protection); Jodi Finder & Steven M.
Reiness, Note, General Permits Under Wetlands Law: The Rise and Fall of Nationwide Permit 26.
3 ENVTL. LAW. 891, 896--97 (1997) (same).
34. SWANCC, supra note 2.
35. See infra notes 222-29, 246 and accompanying text.
36. See Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 8, at 11042-43 (discussing cases interpreting
SWANCC's impact on FWPCA jurisdiction); Calderon, supra note 8, at 316-19 (2002) (same);
Lawrence R. Liebesman & Stuart Turner, Summary Of Federal Court Decisions Interpreting The
Supreme Court's 2001 Decision Of Solid Waste Agency Of Northern Cook County v. Corps,
SG096 ALI-ABA 207, 209-15 (May 29-31, 2002) (same).
37. See Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 8, at 11055-56; Liebesman & Turner, supra
note 36, at 209-12; supra note 9 and infra notes 38-40, 312-59, 532 and accompanying text.
38. 250 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2001).
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[SWANCC), it appears that a body of water is subject to regulation under
the [Act] if the body of water is actually navigable or is adjacent to an
open body of navigable water"; on December 16, 2003, just before this
article was published, the Fifth Circuit in its decision In re Needham
confirmed its narrow interpretation of the Act in light of SWANCC and
explicitly rejected the narrow interpretation of SWANCC and broad
interpretation of the Act recently adopted by the Fourth and Sixth
Circuits. 39 Several district court decisions had come to the same
conclusion as the Fifth Circuit, but some of these decisions were recently
reversed by the Fourth and Sixth Circuits.40 This narrow position is at
odds with the Act's broad ecological goals, is inconsistent with a careful
reading of Riverside Bayview, and is not required by SWANCC. 41
Conversely, a majority of courts have read SWANCC narrowly to
mean that although the Act does not reach isolated, non-navigable waters
with no connection to navigable waters, it does reach inland waters or
wetlands that have a hydrological or ecological connection to navigable
waters. 42 In Headwaters v. Talent Irrigation District,43 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit read SWANCC narrowly by
broadly defining navigable waters to include irrigation canals that were
designed to be isolated from navigable water but which, in fact,
39. /d. at 269; accord In re Needham, 2003 WL 22953383 (5 th Cir. Dec. 16. 2003) (No.0230217) (confirming its narrow interpretation of the Act's jurisdiction in light of SWANCC and
explicitly rejecting the broad view of Act's jurisdiction and narrow interpretation of SWANCC in
United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698 (4'" Cir. 2003), petition for cert. filed, 72 U.S.L.W. 3356
(U.S. Nov. 10, 2003) (No. 03-701) and United States v. Rapanos, 339 F.3d 447 (6th Cir. 2003),
petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Dec. 22, 2003) (No. 03-929)); see also Liebesman & Turner, supra
note 36, at 209-10.
40. See FD & P Enters. v. United States Army Corps. of Eng'rs, 239 F. Supp. 2d 509, 516
(D.N.J. 2003) (concluding SWANCC's "significant nexus" test requires "more than a mere
'hydrological connection"'); United States v. RGM Corp., 222 F. Supp. 2d 780, 786-88 (E.D.Ya.
2002) (holding that Act's jurisdiction does not reach wetlands adjacent to and flowing into manmade ditches and streams that only occasionally flow into navigable waters) (government appeal
pending); United States v. Rapanos, 190 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1015 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (holding
wetlands not adjacent to navigable waters are outside scope of FWPCA and stating that
Supreme Court's SWANCC decision "establish[es] a mode of analysis for this Court"), rev'd, 339
F.3d 447 (6th Cir. 2003), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Dec. 22, 2003) (No. 03-929); United States v.
Newdunn Assocs., 195 F. Supp. 2d 751, 767-68 (E.D. Va. 2002) (holding Army Corps of
Engineers did not prove sufficient connection between wetlands on owner's property and
navigable waters and therefore did have jUrisdiction over wetlands adjacent to multiple drainage
ditches), rev'd, Treacy v. Newdunn Associates, 344 F.3d 407( 4th Cir. 2003), petition for cert. filed,
72 U.S.L.W. 3310 (U.S. Oct. 27, 2003) (No. 03-637); Liebesman & Turner, supra note 36, at 21012.
41. See infra notes 353-61 and accompanying text.
42. See, e.g., Headwaters v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526, 533 (9th Cir. 2001); United
States v, Interstate Gen, Co., 152 F. Supp. 2d 843, 846-47 (D. Md. 2001); United States v. Krilich,
152 F. Supp, 2d 983, 992 n.13 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F. Supp, 2d
1169,1178 (D. Idaho 2001); United States v. Buday, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1282,1289 (D. Mont. 2001);
Liebesman, supra note 36, at 212-15,
43. 243 F.3d 526.
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sometimes became intermittent tributaries to a navigable waterway when
a waste gate malfunctioned. 44 Similarly, several district court decisions
found that the Act applies to ditches or wetlands that indirectly or
intermittently flow into navigable waters without a direct or contiguous
connection to those waters. 45 While a majority of courts have followed
Headwaters' broad interpretation of SWANCC's significant nexus test
and the Ninth Circuit's narrow reading of the impact of SWANCC,46 none
of these courts provided a clear definition of the "significant nexus" or
"hydrological connection" test. Some of these cases suggest or state that a
hydrological connection brings non-navigable waters within the Act's
jurisdiction when a mere drop of water reaches navigable watersY Such a
loose approach to defining a hydrological connection ignores SWA NCC's
requirement of a significant nexus. 48
The "significant nexus" or "hydrological connection" approach
announced by the SWANCC Court raises many questions that the lower
courts have not been able to address satisfactorily. This Article proposes
an intermediate position that requires more than a token hydrological
connection to invoke the Act's jurisdiction,49 but also rejects the view that
adjacent wetlands and tributaries must directly abut navigable waters to
constitute "waters of the United States."so The Article concludes that
courts should interpret the Act to include non-navigable waters,
wetlands, or tributaries that possess a significant hydrological connection
or nexus with navigable waters. Courts should find a "significant nexus"
where non-navigable waters have a clearly perceptible impact on
navigable waters or where there is a reasonable possibility that there
could be such impacts in the futureY If non-navigable waters have an
ecological connection to navigable waters by serving as habitat for
migratory birds or other species, but no significant hydrological
connection exists, then the non-navigable waters would be regrettably
beyond the scope of the Act. However, if some hydrological connection
between non-navigable waters and navigable waters exists, then the
44. Id. at 533; Liebesman & Turner, supra note 36, at 212-13; Hans Hull, In Brief, Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals Maintains Broad Clean Water Act Jurisdiction, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 436
(2002).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Lamplight Equestrian Center, 2002 WL 360652, at *7, 54
ERC 1217, 32 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,526 (N.D. Ill. 2002); United States v. Rueth, 189 F. Supp. 2d 874,
877 (N.D. Ind. 2001), order vacating order in part (2002), affd, 335 F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 72 U.S.L.W. 3282, (U.S. Dec. 1, 2003) (No. 03-548); United States v. Interstate Gen. Co.,
152 F. Supp. 2d 843, 846-47 (D. Md. 2001); Krilich, 152 F. Supp. 2d at 991 n.13; Bosma, 143 F.
Supp. 2d at 1178; Buday, 138 F. Supp. 2d at 1289; Liebesman & Turner, supra note 36, at 213--15.
46. See infra notes 365-448 and accompanying text.
47. See Rueth, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 877-78; infra notes 516-21 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 515-22 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 52,176-85,353-57,384,520-22,531-42 and accompanying text.
50. See id; infra notes 544-49,553-58 and accompanying text.
51.

[d.
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presence of ecological connections should serve as a tiebreaker in close
cases.
In determining jurisdiction, the agencies should consider the distance
between non-navigable "adjacent wetlands" and navigable waters
because the term "adjacent" implies that the wetlands are in reasonable
proximity to navigable waters or a non-navigable tributary to navigable
watersY On the other hand, the agencies and the courts should define a
"tributary" of navigable waters to include intermittent streams, manmade ditches, and underground waters that have a significant
hydrological connection to navigable waters regardless of distance. 53 Even
after SWANCC, the Act's jurisdiction should usually include wetlands
that are adjacent to a non-navigable tributary that is hydrologically
connected to navigable waters because such wetlands are likely to affect
the water quality of the tributary and, in turn, the water quality of the
navigable waters. 54 A more difficult question is whether Congress
intended the Act to include groundwater that directly flows into surface
waters. This Article favors including groundwater that has a significant
and direct nexus with surface waters. That issue is not as easily resolved
by applying a significant nexus standard, however, because the Act's
legislative history is ambiguous about whether Congress intended the Act
to include groundwater. A reasonable interpretation of SWANCC's
"significant nexus" language to include all non-navigable waters with
significant hydrological connections to navigable waters could achieve
many of the Act's ecological goals, but still respect SWANCC's emphasis
on navigability. The agencies should adopt a reasonable definition of
SWANCC's significant nexus test to include all non-navigable wetlands
and tributaries that contribute a significant amount of water to navigable
waters and err on the side of inclusion if non-navigable waters have a
significant ecological effect on navigable waters.

52. Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 42 Fed. Reg. 37122, 37128--29 (1977)
(stating that adjacent wetlands "directly connect," "form the border," "or are in reasonable
proximity to other waters."); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 13334 (1985) (approving Corps' regulations including reasonable proximity test); Scott Bergstrom,
Comment, Overflowing Jurisdictional Banks: The Extension of Regulatory Authority Over
"Navigable Waters" Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 41 U. KAN. L. REV. 835, 846, 846
n.80 (1993).
53.
See infra notes 535-38 and accompanying text.
54. United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, 702 (4th Cir. 2003). petition for cert. filed. 72
U.S.L.W. 3356 (U.S. Nov. 10,2003) (No. 03-701) (holding Corps has jurisdiction over wetlands
adjacent to non-navigable drainage ditch, which is eventual tributary to navigable waters); see
infra notes 185, 353-57 and accompanying text.
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FEDERAL REGULATION OF NAVIGATION

The Federal Navigation Power and State Sovereignty

States have traditionally exercised sovereignty over navigable waters
within their borders. The authority stems from the English common law's
recognition that the King possessed sovereign authority over all navigable
waters, including those in the American colonies.55 After the American
Revolution, the original thirteen states inherited the King's sovereign
authority over their navigable waters. 56 Under the Constitution's equal
footing doctrine, new states are admitted to statehood with the same
sovereign authority as existing states. New states, therefore, have
sovereign authority over their navigable waters, which include waters
navigable-in-fact at the time of statehood and those subject to the ebb
and flow of the tide. 57 Additionally, courts have recognized that states
possess a public trust over navigable waters, their beds and their banks,
which limits the rights of private landowners to take actions inconsistent
with the state's interest in navigation. 58
Even where a state has title to navigable waters within its borders,
under the Constitution's federalist structure, the federal navigation power
55. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1,57 (1894) ("At common law. the title and dominion
in lands f1ow~d by the tide were in the King for the benefit of the nation."); Craig, supra note 32,
at 10520; Roderick E. Walston, The Federal Commerce and Navigation Powers: Solid Waste
Agency of Northern Cook County's Undecided Constitutional Issue, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
699,721 (2002).
56. See Shively, 152 U.S. at 57 ("Upon the American Revolution, [the right to regulate
navigable waters], charged with a like trust, were vested in the original States within their
respective borders, subject to the rights surrendered by the Constitution of the United States.");
Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842) ("[W)hen the revolution took place, the people of
each state became themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute right to all their
navigable waters, and the soils under them, for their own common use, subject only to the rights
since surrendered to the general government."); Craig, supra note 32, at 10520; Walston, supra
note 55, at 721.
57. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 4g4 U.S. 469, 478-g1 (19g8) (the state has the
right to waters that ebb and flow with tide); California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 654-55
(1978); United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 407-D9 (1940) (holding state
can have right to waters not navigable-in-fact at time of statehood); Kansas v. Colorado, 206
U.S. 46, 94 (1907); United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 704-06
(1899); Shively, 152 U.S. at 26-27, 49-50, 57 (stating "[t]he new States admitted into the Union
since the adoption of the Constitution have the same rights as the original States in the tide
waters, and in the lands under them, within their respective jurisdictions."); see also Pollard's
Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 223-24, 229 (1845); Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 (1877);
Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 381-82 (1891); Craig, supra note 32, at 10520; Walston, supra
note 55, at 721.
58. See. e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co., 484 U.S. at 471- 85 (holding quiet title to submerged
lands rested in the state of Mississippi rather than in private landowners); Illinois Cent. R.R. v.
Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892) (stating navigable waters, their beds and banks are "held in
trust for the people ... that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carryon commerce
over them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed from the obstruction of interference of
private parties."); Craig, supra note 32, at 10520.
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limits the traditional sovereign powers of states over their waters. 59 The
Constitution does not directly mention federal regulation of navigation,
but Congress' authority over navigation has long been presumed based
on its authority under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution to
"regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
states."60 In 1824, Chief Justice Marshall wrote a masterful opinion in
Gibbons v. Ogden61 concluding that Congress had authority under the
Commerce Clause to license steamboat operations in New York waters
because Congress had the power to regulate both interstate commerce
and intrastate activities affecting interstate commerce. 62 Marshall found
Congress' authority to regulate navigation clearly implied in the
Commerce Clause. Broadly defining "commerce" as "the commercial
intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches,"63
Marshall reasoned that "[t]he mind can scarcely conceive a system for
regulating commerce between nations, which shall exclude all laws
concerning navigation."64 The Chief Justice divined the minds of "all
America" as understanding '''commerce' to comprehend navigation.,,6s
The Supreme Court has recognized that Congress may implement its
commerce power over navigation by regulating navigable waters that
serve as channels of interstate and foreign commerce. 56 This authority
59. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 172 (1979); Utah v. United States,
403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971); Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. at 404-05; United States v. Texas.
339 U.S. 707,717 (1950); United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935); Lewis Blue Point Oyster
Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82, 87-88 (1913); Craig, supra note 32, at 10520; Walston, supra note 55,
at 720.
60. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 3; see Albrecht & Nickelsburg. supra note 8, at 1104344;
Craig, supra note 32, at 10521; Walston. supra note 55, at 719.
61. 22 U.S. (9 WheaL) 1 (1824).
62 Id. at 186-98. Craig, supra note 32, at 10521; Bradford Mank, Protecting Intrastate
Threatened Species: Does the Endangered Species Act Encroach on Traditional State Authority
and Exceed the Outer Limits of the Commerce Clause?, 36 GA. L. REV. 723, 735-36 (2002); Louis
J. Virelli III & David S. Leibowitz, "Federalism Whether They Want It or Not":The New
Commerce Clause Doctrine and the Future of Federal Civil Rights Legislation After United States
v. Morrison, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 926, 927-29 (2001) (arguing Chief Justice Marshall's opinion
in Gibbons adopted broad interpretation of commerce power); Sophie Akins, Note, Congress'
Property Clause Power to Prohibit Taking Endangered Species, 28 HASTINGS CON ST. L.Q. 167.
169-70 (2000) (stating that Chief Justice Marshall's Gibbons opinion implied commerce power
reaches intrastate activities affecting interstate commerce).
63. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 189-90.
64. Id. at 190.
65. /d.
66. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 172 (1979); United States v. Grand River
Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229, 231-32 (1960); United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222,
224-25 (1955); Oklahoma ex rei. Phillips Y. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 523 (1941);
United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 404 (1940); Lewis Blue Point
Oyster Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82, 87-88 (1913); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power
Co., 229 U.S. 53,63 (1913); United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690,
706-08 (1899); Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 89-90; Craig, supra note 32, at 10520; Walston,
supra note 55, at 719.
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includes a navigation "servitude" or "easement" in navigable waters that
is superior to the rights of states and private individuals. 67 Under the
common law, the navigation servitude limited the rights of individuals to
compensation for what would otherwise: be a taking of property under the
Fifth Amendment. 68 If the federal navigation power does not apply, states
possess sovereign rights to their navigable internal waters,69 For example,
when it sold or gave federal public land to miners or settlers during the
nineteenth century,1o Congress recognized that internal, non-navigable
waters on such land were subject to state law and control. 71 Thus, while
states retain authority over purely intrastate navigable waters that do not
service interstate commerce, the federal government controls navigable
interstate waters.

B.

An Expanding Scope: Nineteenth Century Interpretation of Navigable
Waters

Before 1936, the Supreme Court read the Commerce Clause
narrowly to include only the actual interstate transportation of
commercial goods and excluded intrastate manufacturing activities, even
if a product later entered interstate commerce, on the grounds that the
intrastate manufacturing only indirectly affected interstate commerce.72
67. See Kaiser Aetna, 444 u.s. at 178 ("servitude"); United States v. Gerlach Live Stock
Co., 339 U.S. 725, 736 (1950) ("easement"); Lewis Blue Point Oyster Co., 229 U.S. at 87-88;
Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. at 63 ("servitude"): Craig, supra note 32, at 10520;
Walston, supra note 55, at 719.
68. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. at 60; see also Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at
175 (explaining history of navigation servitude); Craig, supra note 32, at 10520; Walston, supra
note 55, at 719. The Supreme Court has more recently recognized some property rights for
substantial takings that deprive an owner of the right to exclude. See Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at
170-80; Craig, supra note 32, at 10520.
69. See, e.g., Oregon ex rei. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363,
372-74 (1977); United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 717 (1950); United States v. Oregon, 295
U.S. 1, 14 (1935); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26-27, 49-50 (1894); Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S.
371, 381-82 (1891); Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 (1877); Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44
U.S. 212, 223, 229 (1845); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367,410 (1842); Craig, supra note 32, at
10520; Walston, supra note 55, at 721.
70. See Mining Acts of 1866 and 1870, 14 Stat. 251 (1866), as amended, 16 Stat. 217 (1871),
43 U.s.c. § 661; Desert Land Act of 1877, ch. 107, 43 U.S.c. § 321 (2003) (providing for
disposition of public domain lands to miners, homesteaders and others); Walston, supra note 55,
at 721 n.107.
71. See California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 158
(1935) (stating several mining and public domain statutes together "effected a severance of all
waters upon the public domain, not theretofore appropriated, from the land itself. "); Walston,
supra note 55, at 721 & n.107; Accordingly, states enjoy "plenary control" of their non-navigable
waters. California Oregon Power Co., 295 U.S. at 163-64; See Walston, supra note 55, at 721
n.107.
72. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (holding Commerce Clause did not
authorize child labor laws because intrastate manufacturing is not interstate commerce even
though products later entered interstate commerce), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100, 116 (1941); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (holding sugar
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Thus, courts focused on whether an activity was interstate or intrastate
rather than on the activity's ultimate impact on interstate commerce. 73
Second, during the nineteenth century, the Court limited federal
authority over navigable waters to waters that were "navigable in fact. ,,74
In The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, the Supreme Court in 1851
held that the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States
extended beyond waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, which
was the English standard for defining its admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction, to actually navigable lakes and rivers used in interstate
commerce. 75 In 1871, the Court in The Daniel Ball defined navigable
waters of the United States as those "form[ed] in their ordinary condition
by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a continued highway over
which commerce is or may be carried on with other States or foreign
countries in the customary modes in which such commerce is conducted
by water. ,,76
The Court slowly began to expand the scope of federal jurisdiction
through a series of decisions beginning in the late nineteenth century.
Initially, the Court recognized the federal government's right to regulate
non-navigable waters that affected navigable waters. Congress took the
next step by enacting legislation authorizing the federal government to
remove obstructions from navigable waters. In 1888 however, the
Supreme Court concluded that the common law did not give the federal
government the power to remove obstructions in navigable waters. 77 In
response, Congress in 1890 enacted the River and Harbor Act (1890 Act),
which empowered the Secretary of War to prohibit construction,
including dredging and filling, that obstructed navigable waters. 78 In 1899,
the Supreme Court, applying the 1890 Act, held the United States could
enjoin the construction of a dam in a non-navigable section of the upper
Rio Grande River to prevent obstruction of the navigable portions of the

manufacturers were outside Sherman Act because sugar manufacturing was intrastate activity
even if sugar later entered interstate commerce); Mank. supra notc 62, at 736; Philip Weinberg,
It's Time For Congress to Rearm the Army Corps of Engineers: A Response to the Solid Waste
Agencv Decision. 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 531. 533 (2001).
73. See generally Hammer, 247 U.S. at 271-72; Mank, supra note 62, at 736.
74. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1871); Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 8,
at 11043-44; Joseph J. Kala, "Now Open for Development?": The Present State of Regululion of
Activities in North Carolina Wetlands, 79N.C. L. REV. 1667, 16~7--8~ (2001).
75. See 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 453-58 (1851).
76. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 563; Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 8, at
11043-44; Craig, supra note 32, at 10520-21; Kala, supra note 74, at 1687, 1689-90.
77. See Williamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1,8 (1888); Bergstrom, supra note
52, at 836.
78. Pub. L. No. 51-907, 26 Stat. 454 (1890), § 10 "prohibiting the creation of any
obstruction, not affirmatively authorized by law, to the navigable capacity of any waters, in
respect to which the United States has jurisdiction."
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River. 79 The Court recognized that activities in non-navigable waters
were within the scope of the statute and congressional power because
non-navigable waters affected navigable waters.so
Responding to ambiguities in the 1890 Act, Congress enacted the
broader River and Harbor Act in 1899 (1899 Act) to protect navigable
waters from obstructions by requiring congressional consent or a permit
from the Corps for any construction in such waters. S! Congress used
broader language in the 1899 Rivers and Harbors Act, using the more
general term "waters of the United States" in addition to "navigable
waters of the United States." Section 10 of the 1899 Act forbids "[t]he
creation of any obstruction ... to the navigable capacity of any of the
waters of the United States."82 Section 10 refers to the terms "navigable
waters of the United States" and "waters of the United States," but
courts have construed both terms in the 1899 Act to apply only to
navigable waters. 83 Under the 1899 Act, the term "navigable waters" is
limited to "those waters of the United States which are subject to the ebb
and flow of the tide, and/or are presently, or have been in the past, or
may be in the future susceptible for use for purposes of interstate or
foreign commerce."84
Finally, Congress expanded its area of authority over navigation to
include discharges of refuse into and nearby navigable waters. Section 13
of the 1899 Act, commonly referred to as the Refuse Act, makes
[i]t unlawful to throw, discharge, or deposit ... any refuse matter of
any kind or description whatever other than that flowing from
streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state, into any
navigable water of the United States, or into any tributary of any
navigable water from which the same shall float or be washed into
such navigable water. 85
The Refuse Act specifically prohibits adding refuse to non-navigable
tributaries that flow into navigable rivers.86 The statute also prohibits the
deposit of such material on the banks of both non-navigable tributaries
79. See generally United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690,696702,707-10 (1899) (construing River and Harbors Act of 1890, 26 Stat. 454 (1890), to prohibit
obstructions in non-navigable waters that interfere with navigable waters); Kala, supra note 74,
at 169l.
80. See Rio Grande, 174 U.S. at 709-10.
81. River and Harbor Act of 1899, ch. 425,30 Stat. 1121, 1151,33 U.S.c. § 401 (2003);
Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 8, at 11044-45; Craig, supra note 32, at 10520; Walston,
supra note 55, at 723-24; Bergstrom, supra note 52, at 836.
82. 33 U.S.c. § 403 (2003); see Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 8, at 11044; Walston,
supra note 55, at 723-24.
83. See 33 U.S.c. § 403; United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498 F.2d 597, 608-11 (3d CiT.
1974); Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 8, at 11044.
84. 33 C.F.R. § 329.4; see Craig, supra note 32, at 10520.
85. 33 U.S.c. § 407; Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 8, at 11044.
86. 33 U.S.C. § 407; Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 8, at 11044-45.
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and navigable rivers if such material washes into a navigable water and
causes the obstruction of navigation. s7

C.

The Twentieth Century Brings a Broader View of the Federal
Navigation Power

During most of the twentieth century, courts broadened their
interpretation of Congress' authority over interstate commerce, which in
turn led courts to expand the federal navigation power as wel1. 88 First, the
courts generally expanded the scope of the Commerce Clause. Beginning
in 1937, in the seminal case of NLRB v. Jones Laughlin Steel Corp.,89 the
Supreme Court held that intrastate activities that "have such a close and
substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential
or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions"
are within the scope of the Commerce Clause.90 After 1937, the Court
applied a rational basis review to congressional legislation enacted
pursuant to the Commerce Clause and did not generally distinguish
between activities that directly or indirectly affected interstate
commerce. 91 From 1937 to 1995, the Supreme Court deferentially
reviewed most regulatory laws enacted pursuant to the Commerce
Clause. 92 In FWPCA cases, the Court began to focus on whether an
87. 33 u.s.c. § 407; Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 8, at 11044-45.
88. See generally NLRB v. Jones Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n. 452 U.S. 264 (1981); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377
(1940); United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960); Federal Power Commission v.
Union Electric Company, 381 U.S. 90 (1965); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224
(1966).
89. 301 U.S. 1, 36-39 (1937).
90. Compare id. at 36-39 (holding statute prohibiting unfair labor practices is within
commerce power), with Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 310-11 (1936) (rejecting similar
labor laws in the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act as exceeding commerce power); Mank,
supra note 62, at 736 (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. 1); Omar N. White, The
Endangered Species Act's Precarious Perch: A Constitutional Analysis Under the Commerce
Clause and the Treaty Power, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 215, 235 (2000); Weinberg, supra note 72, at 533
& n.13, 538.
91. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 606 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting); Christy H.
Dral & Jerry J. Phillips, Commerce by Another Name: Lopez, Morrison, SWANCC, and Gibbs,
31 ENVTL. L. REP. (NEWS & ANALYSIS) 10413,10413 (April 2001); Mank, supra note 62, at 73637.
92. See, e.g., Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 281-82 (approving under commerce
power federal regulation of intrastate mining activities under the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977 to prevent ruinous competition among states that would likely lead to
inadequate environmental standards); Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 246 (upholding use of
commerce power to enact civil rights legislation prohibiting racial discrimination in public
accommodations); Eric Brignac, Recent Development, The Commerce Clause Justification of
Federal Endangered Species Protection: Gibbs v. Babbitt, 79 N.C. L. REV. 873, 874 (2001); Dral &
Phillips, supra note 91. at 10413; Mank, supra note 62, at 737; Weinberg, supra note 72, at 534,
539.
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activIty was within Congress' authority to regulate activities that
"substantially affect" interstate commerce.93
Second, the Court expanded the definition of "navigable waters" to
include a wider range of purposes than just navigation. For example, the
Court held in the 1940 decision United States v. Appalachian Electric
Power Co. that Congress had authority under the Commerce Clause to
promote the development of electric power under the Federal Power Act
even if those purposes did not serve navigation needs. 94 The Court found
that navigability was but one part of the whole of commerce.95 Other
commercial needs such as "[f]lood protection, watershed development,
[and] recovery of the cost of improvements through utilization of power
[were] likewise parts of commerce control" as the "by-products" of the
general use of the rivers for commerce.96 Finally, even if there were no
authority under the Commerce Clause, the Court stated that Congress
had broad "plenary power" --complete authority-- over navigable waters
under its inherent powers as a sovereign to regulate navigation. This
power authorized Congress to prohibit obstructions in those waters
unless its actions violated the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment. 97
Third, the Court expanded the scope of the FWCPA to cover not
only existing navigable waters but also potentially navigable waters. In
Appalachian Power, the Court broadened the definition of "navigable
waters" to include those "susceptible [to navigation] with reasonable
improvement."98 In the 1960 decision United States v. Republic Steel
Corp.,99 the Court held that the 1899 Refuse Act gives the Corps
jurisdiction to regulate obstructions that hinder potential navigation, not
just currently navigable waters. lOO During the early 1970s, several
congressional hearings and committee meetings criticized the Corps'
narrow interpretation of navigation under the 1899 Refuse Act, and
urged the Corps to include any waters that could be made navigable
through reasonable improvements. 101
Fourth, decisions subsequent to Appalachian Power gradually
enlarged the range of circumstances in which the federal government has

93. See Walston, supra note 55, at 700, 729-32 (arguing that the Supreme Court after 1937
took a broader view of the Commerce Clause to authorize federal regulation of activities related
to navigable waters rather than just regulation of navigable waters themselves).
94. See Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. at 426-27; Walston, supra note 55, at 727.
95. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. at 426.
96. ld.
97. ld. at 427.
98. ld. at 406; see Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 8, at 11045; Walston, supra note 55,
at 727.
99. 362 U.S. 482 (1960).
100. ld. at 485-86; Walston, supra note 55, at 724.
101. Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 8, at 11045-46. The Corps was also encouraged to
regulate wholly intrastate. navigable lakes. ld.
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authority over non-navigable tributaries of navigable waters. 102 In the
1965 decision Federal Power Commission v. Union Electric CO.,103 the
Court ruled that the Federal Power Commission's authority over powergeneration facilities extended to non-navigable waters as well, concluding
that the Commerce Clause extends to non-navigable waters. 104 While it
did not construe the jurisdiction of the 1899 Act, the Federal Power
Commission Court's broad interpretation of the commerce power over
non-navigable waters was another step in the direction of giving the
federal government authority over these waters. Beginning in the 1960s,
courts began to read the Refuse Act more broadly to prohibit industrial
discharges not only where they actually obstructed a river, but also where
they simply polluted rivers. Rather than limiting "refuse" to just garbage
that obstructed navigation, the Court included industrial solids and even
liquids as barriers to navigation. lOS By the early 1970s, Congress began to
consider formally expanding the Refuse Act or enacting new legislation
to address the public's growing concern with water pollution. I06 In
response to the growing scope of the 1899 Refuse Act, the Corps
published regulations in 1972 that expanded the definition of navigation
under the Act. 107 Congress shortly thereafter enacted broader changes
through new water pollution legislation.

102. See, e.g., United States v. Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229, 232 (1960); Oklahoma
ex rei. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 523 (1941); Walston, supra note 55, at 720.
103. 381 U.S. 90 (1965).
104. Id. at 99-110; Funk, supra note 3, at 10,765. The non-navigable stream at issue was the
tributary and headwaters of a navigable stream. Federal Power Comm'n, 381 U.S. at 93-94.
While it might have emphasized that the non-navigable water was connected to navigable
waters, the Court determined that Congress has the authority under the Commerce Clause to
regulate the interstate transmission of electricity regardless of whether the waters are navigable.
Id. at 99-110.
105. See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 230 (1966) (holding accidental
release of commercial aviation fuel is prohibited discharge of "refuse" in violation of the Refuse
Act because it pollutes and harms river); United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482,
489-91 (1960) (holding discharge of industrial solids, fine metal particles, constitutes obstruction
within the meaning of Section 10 of the Act both because particles obstruct navigation and harm
the river); Robert L. Potter, Discharging New Wine Into Old Wineskins: The Metamorphosis of
the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,33 U. PITT. L. REV. 483, 487- 89 (1972).
106. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 92-1333 (1972); H.R. REP. NO. 92-1323 (1972); H.R. REP. No.
91-917 (1970); Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 8, at 11045. This discussion led to the passage
of the Clean Water Act. See infra section II.
107. See Definition of Navigable Water of the United States, 37 Fed. Reg. 18289, 18289-92
(Sept. 9, 1972); Charles D. Ablard & Brian Boru O'Neill, Wetland Protection and Section 404 of
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972: A Corps of Engineers Renaissance,
1 VT. L. REV. 51, 62 (1976) (describing four jurisdictional inclusions by the Corps: (1) historical
navigable waters of the United States; (2) waters susceptible to navigation after improvement;
(3) coastal waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide: and (4) the expansion of the definition
of the limit of the ebb and flow of the tide from the mean high-water mark to the mean higher
high-water mark on the West COllst); Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 8, at 11046 n.43
(same); Garrett Power, The Fox in (he Chicken Coop: The Regulatory Program of tile U.S. Army
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THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND REGULATION OF NON-NAVIGABLE WATERS

A.

The 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act

In the 1972 FWPCA, Congress went far beyond the 1899 Act and
adopted a comprehensive approach to regulating pollution and improving
the quality of the nation's waters_lOS The amended statute's goal is "to
restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
the Nation's waters" for current and future generationsYJ9 The Act
prohibits "the discharge of any pollutant by any person" unless she has a
permit issued by the EPA, Corps, or a state using federally-delegated
permit-issuing authorityYo The Act defines the "discharge of a pollutant"
as "any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point
source_ "111 Section 404 of the Act requires all persons to obtain a permit
from the Corps "for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the
navigable waters at specified disposal sites. ,,112
The Act defines the crucial term "navigable waters" as "the waters
of the United States, including the territorial seas."1l3 The Conference
Report for the Act explained that "[t]he conferees fully intend that the
term 'navigable waters' be given the broadest possible constitutional
interpretation unencumbered uy agency determinations which have been
made or may be made for administrative purposes.,,114 Unfortunately,
courts and commentators have disagreed about whether Congress in the
1972 Act intended the term "waters of the United States" to include only
the actually or potentially navigable waters encompassed by Section 10 of
the 1899 Rivers and Harbors Act, or to encompass any waters within the
scope of Congress' authority over interstate commerce under the
Commerce Clause. IIS
Some commentators argue that Congress intended the 1972 FWPCA
to reach the limits of the Commerce Clause by covering a wide range of
non-navigable waters not covered in the 1899 ACt. 116 Though some

Corps of Engineers. 63 VA. L. REV. 503. 514-15 (1977) (noting additions to the Corps'
jurisdictional regulations).
108. See Weinberg. supra note 72. at 535.
109. 33 U.S.C § 1251(a) (2003).
110. [d. § 1311(a).
111 [d. § 1362(12).
112. Jd. § 1344(a).
113. [d. § 1362(7).
114. S. REP. No. 92-1236, at 144 (1972), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at 327;
Albrecht & Nickelsburg. supra note 8, at 11047.
ll5. Compare Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 8, at 11046-49 (arguing Congress in 1972
only sought to address any potentially navigable waters) with Weinberg, supra note 72, at 535
(arguing Congress sought to use its full authority under the commerce power to protect both
navigable and non-navigable waters).
116. See Weinberg, supra note 72. at 535.
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sections of the FWPCA refer to "navigable waters,"1J7 that statute defines
the term to include "the waters of the United States" without any further
reference to navigability.ll8 The House Bill for the 1972 FWPCA had
defined "navigable waters" as the "navigable waters of the United States,
including the territorial seas,,,119 but the final Conference Bill eliminated
the word "navigable.,,120 The EPA and the Corps have both argued that
with this deletion Congress intended to expand the definition of
navigable waters. 121 Other sections of the FWPCA apply to "intrastate
waters"122 and "any waters."123 In the 1974 decision United States v.
Ashland Oil & Transportation Co.,l24 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit interpreted the Conference Report's reference to the
"the broadest possible constitutional interpretation unencumbered by
agency determinations which have been made or may be made for
administrative purposes" to mean that Congress intended that the Act
reach any activity that substantially affects commerce. 125 This
interpretation reflected the broadest definition of congressional authority
over interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause. 126 In the 1979
decision Kaiser Aetna v. United States,127 Justice Rehnquist appeared to
repudiate the Court's traditional emphasis on navigability of waters and
focus squarely on Congress' authority to regulate interstate commerce
under the Commerce Clause. He found that the "navigability of a
waterway adds little if anything to the breadth of Congress' regulatory
power over interstate commerce.,,128 Rather, Justice Rehnquist focused
on the effect waters have on interstate commerce. In particular, he found
that economic activities that affect interstate commerce "are susceptible
of congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause irrespective of
whether navigation, or, indeed, water, is involved."129 Consequently,
117. 33 u.s.c. § 1344; see Weinberg, supra note 72, at 535.
118. See, e.g., 33 U.S.c. § 1312(a) (establishing water quality-related effluent limitations for
"navigable waters"); see id. § 1362(7); Weinberg, supra note 72, at 535.
119. H.R. 11896, 92nd Congo § 502(8) (1972), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1069;
Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 8, at 11047.
120. See supra notes 113-115 and accompanying text.
121. See Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 8, at 11047.
122. 33 U.S.c. § 1313(a)(2) (stating EPA must approve state water quality standards for
intrastate waters); see Weinberg, supra note 72, at 535.
123. 33 U.S.c. § 1317(a)(2) (stating that EPA effluent limitations for toxic pollutants "shall
take into account the ... presence of the affected organisms in any waters"); see Weinberg. supra
note 72, at 535.
124. 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974).
125. /d. at 1325; see Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 8, at 11047 & n.S2.
126. See id. at 1325; Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 8, at 11047.
127. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
128. [d. at 173-74 (internal citations omitted); Craig, supra note 32, at 10521; Walston, supra
note 55, at 731-32.
129. 444 U.S. at 173-74 (internal citations omitted); Craig, supra note 32, at 10521; Walston,
supra note 55, at 731-32.
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Justice Rehnquist's Kaiser Aetna opinion defined congressional authority
under the FWPCA in terms of the Commerce Clause rather than
navigability.
By contrast, some commentators argue that the conferees' language
shows that they simply intended to require the broadest constitutional
authority over traditional navigable waters. 130 In SWANCC, the
government conceded that it was "somewhat ambiguous" whether the
conferees' language sought to reach the broadest possible limits of
navigability or the Commerce Clause.!31 In light of Congress' concern
during the early 1970s that the Corps failed to read the 1899 Act to the
fullest possible limits of navigability, some commentators contend that
Congress more likely intended the 1972 Act only to reach navigability
rather than Commerce Clause limits.132
B.

The EPA and the Corps Initially Disagreed About the Act's
Jurisdiction

Initially, the EPA and the Corps disagreed about the jurisdiction of
the 1972 FWPCA. In 1973, the EPA's general counsel issued an opinion
that the "the deletion of the word 'navigable' [in the 1972 FWPCA]
eliminates the requirement of navigability. The only remaining
requirement, then, is that pollution of waters covered by the bill must be
capable of affecting interstate commerce."133 By contrast, in 1971, the
EPA's general counsel promulgated an opinion concluding that overland
connections were insufficient to establish federal jurisdiction over
navigable intrastate lakes for the purpose of the pre-1972 version of the
FWPCA. 134 Accordingly, the EP A understood the 1972 Act as
significantly expanding the Agency's jurisdiction over the nation's waters.
In May 1973, the EPA promulgated regulations defining navigable waters
requiring a permit to include:
(1) All navigable waters of the United States;
(2) Tributaries of navigable waters of the United States;
(3) Interstate waters;

130. See Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 8, at 11047.
13l. See SWANCC, supra note 2, at 168 n.3 (citing Brief for Federal Respondents at 24);
Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 8, at 11047.
132. See Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 8, at 11047-49.
133. EPA General Counsel Opinion (Feb. 6, 1973); see Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note
8. at 11049.
134. See EPA General Counsel Opinion (Dec. 9, 1971) (stating that term "navigable waters
of the United States" in then-existing FWPCA required an interstate water connection and that
an overland connection to a wholly intrastate navigable lake was insufficient); Albrecht &
Nickelsburg, supra note 8, at 11046 & n.40, 11049 & n.61.
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(4) Intrastate lakes, rivers, and streams which are utilized by
interstate travelers for recreational or other purposes;

(5) Intrastate lakes, rivers, and streams from which fish or shell fish
are taken and sold in interstate commerce;
(6) Intrastate lakes, rivers, and streams which are utilized for
industrial purposes by industries in interstate commerce.!35
The Corps, on the other hand, defined its jurisdiction as simply the
broadest possible definition of actually and potentially navigable
waters.u6 In a 1974 rule addressing its jurisdiction under Section 404 of
the Act, the Corps interpreted the 1972 FWPCA Conference Report's
reference to "the broadest possible constitutional interpretation,
unencumbered by agency determinations which have been made or may
be made for administrative purposes" to relate to prior judicial
precedents addressing the constitutional limits of actually or potentially
navigable waters.!37 The Corps' regulations defined "navigable waters" as
"those waters of the United States which are subject to the ebb and flow
of the tide, andlor are presently, or have been in the past, or may be in
the future susceptible for use for purposes of interstate or foreign
commerce ... .'m8
C.

The Corps' 1975 Interim and 1977 Final Regulations Expand the
FWPCA's Jurisdiction

In the 1975 decision Natural Resources Defense Council v.
Callaway,139 the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
held that the Corps' definition of "navigable waters" was unduly limited
and violated the FWPCA. I40 The court concluded that Congress "asserted
federal jurisdiction over the nation's waters to the maximum extent
permissible under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution."141 Thus,
"the term [navigable waters] is not limited to the traditional tests of
navigability."142 In an order without an opinion, the court comm<nded the

135. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, 38 Fed. Reg. 13528, 13528-29 (May
3,1973); Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 8, at 11049-50 & n.64.
136. Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 8, at 11050.
137. Permits for activities in Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 39 Fed. Reg. 12115 (Apr.
3, 1974) (stating "[T]o give [the Conference Report] the broadest possible Constitutional
interpretation-is the same as the basic premise from which the aforementioned judicial
precedents [defining the "navigable waters of the United States"] have evolved."); Albrecht &
Nickelsburg, supra note 8, at 11050.
138. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(1) (1974); Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 8, at 11050.
139. 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975); Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 8, at 11050.
140. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. at 686; see also Weinberg. supra note 72. at 535-36.
141. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. at 686.
142 [d.
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Corps to issue regulations "clearly recognizing the full regulatory
mandate of the Water Act."143
In response to the Callaway decision, the Corps issued interim
regulations in 1975 that defined navigable waters to include intrastate
lakes, rivers and streams that are used by interstate travelers or in
interstate commerce. l44 The 1975 regulations established three phases for
expanding the Corps' jurisdiction: phase one, which took effect
immediately, included all navigable waters covered by the 1974
regulation and the 1899 Act; phase two, effective after July 1, 1976,
expanded the Corps' jurisdiction to non-navigable tributaries, freshwater
wetlands adjacent to primary navigable waters, and lakes; and phase
three, effective after July 1, 1977, broadened the Corps' jurisdiction to all
other waters covered under the statute, including "intermittent rivers,
streams, tributaries, and perched wetlands that are not contiguous or
adjacent to navigable waters" whenever the Corps determines the
regulation is necessary for the protection of water quality.145 In 1977, the
Corps issued a final rule that included isolated wetlands and waters
whose degradation or destruction could affect interstate commerce. 146
143. Id.
144. The regulations stated:
Intrastate lakes, rivers and streams landward to their ordinary high water mark and up to their
headwaters that are utilized:
(1) By interstate travelers for water-related recreational purposes;

(2) For the removal of fish that are sold in interstate commerce;
(3) For industrial purposes by industries in interstate commerce;
(4) In the production of agricultural commodities sold or transported in interstate
commerce; ... and
(i) Those other waters which the District Engineer determines necessitate
regulation for the protection of water quality.
Permits for activities in Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 40 Fed. Reg. 31,320, 31,324 (July 25,
1975); Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 8, at 11050-51 & n.76; see Weinberg, supra note 72, at
536.
145. Permits for activities in Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 40 Fed. Reg. at 31325-26;
see SWANCC, supra note 2, at 184 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing 1975 Interim Corps'
regulations ).
146. The Corps defined the "waters of the United States" as:
(1) The territorial seas ... ;
(2) Coastal and inland waters, lakes, rivers, and streams that are navigable waters of
the United States, including adjacent wetlands;
(3) Tributaries to navigable waters of the United States, including adjacent wetlands
(man-made nontidal drainage and irrigation ditches excavated on dry land are not
considered waters of the United States under this definition);
(4) Interstate waters and their tributaries including adjacent wetlands; and
(5) All other waters of the United States not identified in paragraphs (1)- (4) above,
such as isolated wetlands and lakes, intermittent streams, prairie potholes, and other
waters that are not part of a tributary system to interstate waters or to navigable
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Congress' 1977 Amendments: Acquiescence to the Corps'
Regulations?

In 1977, Congress amended the FWPCA, but failed to clarify the
definition of navigable waters or the scope of the Act's jurisdiction. In
light of the Callaway decision, the House considered, but did not enact, a
bill that would have explicitly recognized the Corps' jurisdiction under
Section 404 of the 1972 FWPCA over "all waters which are presently
used, or are susceptible to use in their natural condition or by reasonable
improvement as a means to transport interstate or foreign commerce.,,147
The Senate narrowly defeated a similar bill. 148 The Conference
Committee considered both bills, but in the end, Congress did not amend
the definition of navigable waters. 149 Until the Supreme Court decided
the issue in SWANCC,150 commentators debated whether Congress'
failure to amend the FWPCA should be interpreted as acquiescence to
the Corps' 1977 regulations. J51 Since 1977, the EPA and the Corps have
each claimed broad jurisdiction over interstate navigable waters,
intrastate waters "that could affect interstate or foreign commerce,"
tributaries of interstate waters or intrastate waters affecting interstate or
foreign commerce, and adjacent wetlands. 152

waters of the Untied States, the degradation or destruction of which could affect
interstate commerce.
Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122, 37,144 (July 19, 1977).
147. See H.R. 3199, 95th Congo § 16 (1977), reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1183;
Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 8, at 1105I.
148. See 123 CONGo REC. 26710, 26728 (1977); Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 8, at
11051.
149. See Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 8, at 1105I.
150. See infra notes 231-239 and accompanying text.
151. See Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 8, at 11051 (discussing debate).
152. The 1977 regulations are quoted in supra note 146 and accompanying text. Current
Corps and EPA regulations define "waters of the United States" as listed below:
(1) All waters which are currently used, or were used in the past, or may be
susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters which are
subject to the ebb and flow of the tide;
(2) All interstate waters including interstate wetlands;
(3) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent
streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa
lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which could affect
interstate or foreign commerce including any such waters:
(i) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign travelers for recreational
or other purposes; or
(ii) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and sold in interstate or
foreign commerce; or
(iii) Which are used or could be used for industrial purposes by industries in
interstate commerce;
(4) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined as waters of the United States;
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EXPANSION OF THE ACT: ADJACENT WETLANDS AND MORE?

Riverside Bayview: Providing Support for Broader Agency
Jurisdiction

In the 1985 decision United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,

Inc., I53 the Supreme Court held that the Corps had jurisdiction over nonnavigable wetlands that are adjacent to navigable waters because they are
"waters of the United States" as defined by the Act. 154 The wetlands at
issue were adjacent to and partly abutted Black Creek, a navigable water
of the United States. 155
While some commentators have read Riverside Bayview as a narrow
decision approving jurisdiction only over adjacent wetlands that
immediately abut navigable waters, the Court's reasoning supports a far
broader hydrological connection, or even ecological connection, analysis
emphasizing the biological, rather than the physical, relationship between
non-navigable and navigable waters. 156 The Court observed that the 1972
Act "constituted a comprehensive legislative attempt 'to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters.'''157 To achieve these goals, Congress emphasized the need to
preserve and improve the ecological conditions surrounding these waters.
The House Report on the 1972 Act stated that "the word 'integrity' ...
refers to a condition in which the natural structure and function of
ecosystems [are] maintained."158 In addressing non-navigable waters, the
Court determined that Congress was especially concerned with waters
such as adjacent wetlands that frequently have a substantial ecological
impact on navigable waters. 159 Additionally, the Court found that the
legislative history of the 1972 Act supported a broad view of the Act's
jurisdiction to protect wetlands that have hydrological and ecological
impacts on navigable waters. The Court observed, "Protection of aquatic

(5) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (a)(l) through (4) of this section;
(6) The territorial seas;
(7) Wetlands adjacent to waters (other than waters that are themselves wetlands)
identified in paragraphs (a)(l) through (6) of this section. [exclusions omitted]
33 c.F.R. § 328.3 (2003) (Corps regulations); 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2003) (EPA regulations).
153. 474 U.S. 121 (1985); Funk, supra note 3, at 10,742-44.
154. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 133.
155. ld. at 124, 131.
156. ld. at 134.
157. ld. at 132 (quoting FWPCA § 101,33 U.S.c. § 1251).
158. ld. at 132 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 92-911, 92d Congo p. 76 (1972».
159. See id. at 129-35; Funk, supra note 3, at 10742-44 (discussing Riverside Bayview);
Johnson, supra note 3, at 10672 (arguing that Riverside Bayview allowed regulation of many
waters and wetlands that are not navigable in fact), 10674-75 (discussing nexus standard for
relationship between adjacent wetlands and navigable waters).
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ecosystems, Congress recognized, demanded broad federal authority to
control pollution, for '[ w]ater moves in hydrologic cycles and it is
essential that discharge of pollutants be controlled at the source. ",160
The Riverside Bayview Court concluded that the term "navigable" is
of "limited import" and that Congress sought "to exercise its powers
under the Commerce Clause to regulate at least some waters that would
not be deemed 'navigable' under the classical understanding of that
term.,,161 The Court reasoned that Congress had sought to regulate all
waters that affect navigable waters. In light of legislative history
emphasizing the need to protect non-navigable waters that ecologically
and hydrologically affected navigable waters, the Court found that the
EPA's and the Corps' regulation of "any adjacent wetlands that form the
border of or are in reasonable proximity to other waters of the United
States"162 was appropriate. The Court stressed that the agencies'
"technical expertise" and "ecological judgment" in determining the
relationship "between waters and their adjacent wetlands provide[] an
adequate basis for a legal judgment that adjacent wetlands" are covered
by the Act. 163
The Court concluded that the FWPCA applied to adjacent wetlands
that were not inundated or frequently flooded by navigable waters if the
adjacent wetlands had ecological and biological connections to navigable
waters. 1M In a footnote, the Court stated that to achieve the goal of
160. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 132-33 (quoting S.REP. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 77
(1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3742).
161. !d. at 133.
162. [d. at 133-34 (quoting 42 Fed. Reg. 37,128 (1977».
161 [d. at 134.
164. Id. at 134-35.
This holds true even for wetlands that are not the result of flooding or permeation by
water having its source in adjacent bodies of open water. The Corps has concluded
that wetlands may affect the water quality of adjacent lakes, rivers, and streams even
when the waters of those bodies do not actually inundate the wetlands. For example,
wetlands that are not flooded by adjacent waters may still tend to dram into those
waters. In such circumstances, the Corps has concluded that wetlands may serve to
filter and purify water draining into adjacent bodies of water, See 33 CFR §
320.4(b)(2)(vii) (1985), and to slow the flow of surface runoff into lakes, rivers, and
streams and thus prevent flooding and erosion. See § 320.4(b)(2)(iv),(v). In addition,
adjacent wetlands may "serve significant natural biological functions, including food
chain production, general habitat, and nesting, spawning, rearing and resting sites for
aquatic ... species." See § 320.4(b)(2)(i). In short, the Corps has concluded that
wetlands adjacent to lakes, rivers, streams, and other bodies of water may function as
integral parts of the aquatic environment even when the moisture creating the
wetlands does not find its source in the adjacent bodies of water. Again, we cannot say
that the Corps' judgment on these matters is unreasonable, and we therefore conclude
that a definition of 'waters of the United States' encompassing all wetlands adjacent to
other bodies of water over which the Corps has jurisdiction is a permissible
interpretation of the Act.
Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 134-35.
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preservmg and improving adjacent wetlands that have significant
ecological and hydrological impacts on navigable waters, it was
appropriate for the Corps to regulate all adjacent wetlands, even though
a minority might not have any impacts on navigable waters. 165
Moreover, the Court concluded that the Corps had jurisdiction over
adjacent wetlands because there was evidence that Congress, in enacting
the 1977 Amendments to the Act, had acquiesced to the Corps'
regulations applying the Act to adjacent wetlands. 166 The Court stated:
Although we are chary of attributing significance to Congress' failure
to act, a refusal by Congress to overrule an agency's construction of
legislation is at least some evidence of the reasonableness of that
construction, particularly where the administrative construction has
been brought to Congress' attention through legislation specifically
designed to supplant it. 167
In particular, the Court found there was little question that Congress
had acquiesced to the Corps' administrative regulations addressing
adjacent wetlands. Yet, even had Congress restricted the definition of
"waters of the United States" in 1977, it would have left in place a
definition of "navigable waters" that included waters navigable in fact
and their adjacent wetlands. l68 Thus, the Court found that whether or not
Congress acquiesced to the Corps' regulations, the Act covered adjacent
wetlands.
The Court found that Section 404(g)(1), which was added to the
FWPCA in the 1977 Amendments, recognized the Corps' jurisdiction
over adjacent wetlands. Section 404(g)(1) authorizes states to administer
their own wetland permit programs regulating the discharge of dredged
or fill material into waters. However, state regulation is limited to waters
"other than those waters which are presently used, or are susceptible to
use in their natural condition or by reasonable improvement as a means
to transport interstate or foreign commerce... including wetlands
adjacent thereto.,,169 The "other than those waters," including adjacent
wetlands, must be regulated by the Corps. The Riverside Bayview Court
expressly reserved the question of whether the Act applies to "wetlands
that are not adjacent to open waters. ,,170

165. Id. at 135 n.9.
166. See id. at 136-39; Funk, supra note 3, at 10,742-44 (discussing Riverside Bayview);
Craig, supra note 32, at 10512-13 (discussing Riverside Bayview's conclusion that Congress in
1971 amendments to Clean Water Act acquiesced to the Corps' regulations); Johnson, supra
note 3, at 10672 (arguing that Riverside Bayview allowed regulation of many waters and wetlands
that are not navigable in fact), 10674-75 (discussing nexus standard for relationship between
adjacent wetlands and navigable waters).
167. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 137.
168. Id.
169. 33 U.S.c. § 1344(g)(1) (2003).
170. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 131 n.8.
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In addition, the Court did not precisely define the meaning of
"adjacent" in terms of distance from or impact on navigable waters.
Arguably, the Court implicitly approved the Corps' 1985 definition of
"adjacent", which remains the definition today: "The term adjacent
means bordering, contiguous, or neighboring. Wetlands separated from
other waters of the United States by man-made dikes or barriers, natural
river berms, beach dunes and the like are 'adjacent wetlands."'!7! This
definition does not provide any distance formula for determining which
wetlands are adjacent, but requires an examination of the relationship
between the wetlands and navigable waters. The imprecise and flexible
nature of the Corps' current definition is consistent with similar terms the
Corps has used in the past. For example, in 1977 the Corps' regulations
used the term "in reasonable proximity" to define which wetlands were
adjacent to other waters of the United States.172 In 1981, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan followed the
Corps' then-definition in concluding that wetlands that were within
"reasonable proximity" of a navigable river, despite an intervening
parcel, were "contiguous" adjacent wetlands because a direct
hydrological connection through man-made irrigation ditches existed
between the wetlands and the river.173 This case foreshadowed current
debates over the meaning of "adjacency."
The Riverside Bayview Court emphasized the importance of
hydrological and biological connections between adjacent wetlands and
navigable waters in determining that adjacent wetlands are within the
scope of the Act.!74 The Court acknowledged that some adjacent wetlands
might not have significant hydrological and biological connections with
navigable waters, but concluded that the Corps' regulation was valid in
part because such connections exist in the majority of cases.175 While it
did not address isolated and other non-navigable waters, the Riverside
Bayview decision suggests that hydrological and biological connections
between non-navigable waters and navigable waters should be important
in determining whether other non-navigable waters are within the scope
of the Act.

171. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d) (1985) (currently 33 c.F.R. § 328.3(c) (2003)); see Bergstrom.
supra note 52, at 846.
172. Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122, 37,129 (1977)
(stating that adjacent wetlands "directly connect," "form the border," "or are in reasonable
proximity to other waters."); Bergstrom, supra note 52, at 846 & n.80.
173. See United States v. Lee Wood Contracting, 529 F. Supp. 119, 120--24 (E.D.Mich.
1981); Bergstrom, supra note 52, at 847.
174. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at l32-35; supra notes 162--65 and accompanying text.
175. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at l35 n.9; supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
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Subsequent Cases Interpret "Adjacency" Broadly

Subsequently, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has examined
whether there is a hydrological connection between wetlands and
navigable waters in determining whether wetlands are adjacent.176 In
Conant v. United States,177 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court's finding that wetlands were
adjacent even though they did not directly abut a navigable river because
the wetlands served as filters for the river and thus had a hydrological
connection.178 In United States v. Banks,179 the defendant contended that
his lands, assuming that they contained wetlands at all, contained isolated
wetlands rather than adjacent ones because they were all at least one-half
mile away from any navigable channels and had no hydrological
relationship with navigable waters. ISO The Eleventh Circuit found the
district court's conclusion that the wetlands were adjacent not to be
clearly erroneous in light of the lower court's finding that water from the
wetlands reached the channels through both groundwater and surface
water connections. IS] Also, the district court had "found ecological
adjacency based on the water connections and the fact that the lots serve
as habitat for birds, fish, turtles, snakes and other wildlife. "182 The
Eleventh Circuit's use of hydrological and ecological connections to find
that wetlands were adjacent to navigable waters, even though they did
not immediately abut navigable waters, was consistent with the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Riverside Bayview.
Similarly, in United States v. Pozsgai,l83 the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania concluded that a fourteenacre parcel of land contained adjacent wetlands where a small stream on
the land had a direct hydrological connection with navigable waters
through "an unnamed tributary of the Pennsylvania Canal, which flowed
into the Delaware River."l84 In a subsequent related decision involving
the same wetlands, the Third Circuit concluded that these wetlands were
within the Act's jurisdiction because the statute includes wetlands

176. See United States v. Banks, 115 F.3d 916, 920-21 (11 th Cir. 1997); Conant v. United
States, 786 F.2d 1008 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
177. [d.
178. See id. at 1009-10; Bergstrom, supra note 52, at 847-48 (arguing Conant opinion
"implicitly relied on the 'neighboring' factor [in the Corps' regulations defining adjacent
wetlands) since the court failed to note the existence of vegetation extending to the river").
179. Banks, 115 F.3d 916.
180. [d. at 920-21.
181. [d. at 92l.
182 [d.
183. No. 88-6545, 1991 WL 111175 (E.D.Pa. 1991).
184. See id. at *1-3; Bergstrom, supra note 52, at 848.
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adjacent to a non-navigable tributary that flows into navigable waters. IS5
Thus, several lower courts broadly interpreted Riverside Bayview and the
Corps' regulations concerning adjacent wetlands to conclude that
wetlands were adjacent when a significant hydrological connection
existed between them and a navigable river, even where the wetlands did
not immediately abut those waters.
C.

The 1986 Preamble: The Migratory Bird "Rule"

In 1986, the Corps interpreted its existing regulations defining the
term "waters of the United States" to "include ... waters ... [w]hich are
or would be used as habitat by birds protected by Migratory Bird
Treaties; or [w]hich are or would be used as habitat by other migratory
birds which cross state lines."186 The Corps intended the preamble, which
has been termed the Migratory Bird "Rule," to be consistent with and to
clarify its existing regulations extending the Corps' jurisdiction to all
intrastate waters that affect interstate commerce. Those waters include:
All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including
intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie
potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use,
degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign
commerce including any such waters:
(i) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign travelers for
recreational or other purposes; or
(ii) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and sold in
interstate or foreign commerce; or
(iii) Which are used or could be used for industrial purposes by
industries in interstate commerce. l87
The Migratory Bird "Rule" essentially applied to the phase three waters
identified in the 1975 interim regulations because phase one and two

185. See United States v. Pozsgai. 999 F.2d 719. 727-32 (3d Cir.1993); accord United States
v. Deaton. 332 F.3d 698. 708 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding Corps has jurisdiction over a wetlands
adjacent to a non-navigable drainage ditch, which is eventually a tributary to navigable waters).
petition for cert. filed, 72 U.S.L.W. 3356 (U.S. Nov. 10, 2003) (No. 03-701); see also United States
v. TGR Corp., 171 F.3d 762, 764-65 (2d Cir.1999) (concluding United States has jurisdiction
under Clean Water Act over non-navigable tributary that flows into navigable waters; ); Quivira
Mining Co. v. EPA, 765 F.2d 126,130 (10th Cir. 1985) (same).
186. Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206,
41,217 (Nov.13, 1986) (interpreting 33 C.F.R. § 328.3); see Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 8,
at 11042 n.2, 11052; Calderon, supra note 8, at 308. In 1988, the EPA included the same
migratory bird "rule" in the preamble of one its regulations. See Clean Water Act Section 404
Program Definitions and Permit Exemptions; Section 404 State Program Regulations, 53 Fed.
Reg. 20,765 (1988).
187. 33 c.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3)(i)-(iii) (2003).
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waters were clearly covered by the Act after the Court's Riverside
Bayview decision. l88
Under the Migratory Bird "Rule," the Corps expanded its
jurisdiction to isolated, intrastate waters or wetlands not adjacent to
navigable waters based on their actual or potential use as habitat for
migratory birds. 189 The Corps justified the "rule" based on its need to
prevent the destruction of isolated, intrastate wetlands that served as the
habitat for numerous migratory birds. l90 Because bird watching and bird
hunting of migratory birds has significant economic value, the Corps
reasoned that preserving isolated, intrastate waters would serve to
protect interstate commerce in these birds. 191 Additionally, isolated
intrastate wetlands and waters often offer important environmental
benefits because they are home to many wetland species, including birds,
and frequently provide a buffer against local flooding. 192
Despite its name, the Corps established the Migratory Bird "Rule"
without the notice-and-comment procedures required to promulgate
agency rules.193 The EPA's general counsel issued a legal memorandum in
1985 claiming that the EPA and the Corps had jurisdiction over isolated
waters and wetlands used by migratory birds. The Corps mentioned the
principle in the Federal Register without giving the public the
opportunity to comment on it. 194 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit declared the Migratory Bird "Rule" invalid because
the Corps issued it without public notice-and-comment, but the Corps
continued to apply the "Rule" in other circuits. 195

188. See SWANCC, supra note 2, at 184 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing 1986 Corps'
preamble establishing migratory bird "rule"); see also Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters
or Ocean Waters, 40 Fed. Reg. 31320, 31326 (1975) (establishing three phase approach to Corps'
jurisdiction under FWPCA); supra notes 145-46 and infra note 288 and accompanying text.
189. Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41206,
41217 (Nov. 13, 1986); Funk, supra note 3, at 10,741; Maya R. Moiseyev, Solid Waste Agency of
Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corp of Engineers: The Clean Water Act
Bypasses a Commerce Clause Challenge, But Can the Endangered Species Act?, 7 HASTINGS W.
Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'y 191, 193-94 (2001).
190. Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206,
41,217; Funk, supra note 3, at 10,743; Moiseyev, supra note 189, at 193-94.
191. Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41206,
41217; Funk. supra note 3, at 10,743; Moiseyev, supra note 189, at 193-94.
192. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 10670--71 (discussing benefits of isolated wetlands and
impact of SWANCC).
193. See SWANCC, supra note 2, at 164 n.1; Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 8, at 11042
n.2,11052.
194. Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 8, at 11042 n.2, 11052.
195. See Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 715 F. Supp. 726, 729 (E.D. Va. 1988) (holding
Migratory Bird "Rule" was invalid because it was not promulgated with public notice-and.
comment), afrd, 885 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1989); Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 8, at 11052 &
n.95.
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IV. SWANCC

A.

Lopez and Morrison Reinterpret the Commerce Clause

From 1937 until 1995, courts had consistently applied a broad
interpretation of congressional power under the Commerce Clause, in the
presence of a rational argument that a federally regulated activity
"substantially affected" interstate commerce. 196 In the 1995 opinion
United States v. Lopez,197 however, the Supreme Court significantly
narrowed congressional authority under the Commerce Clause by
rejecting the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990/ 98 which made
possession of a gun within a school zone a federal offense. The Court
reasoned that prosecuting intrastate criminal behavior was traditionally a
state regulatory function outside the scope of the Commerce Clause. 199
Summarizing prior Commerce Clause decisions,2°O the Lopez Court
observed that Congress could regulate three broad types of economic
activity: (1) "the use of the channels of interstate commerce;" (2) "the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from
intrastate activities;" and (3) "those activities having a substantial relation
to interstate commerce ... i.e., those activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce."201 The Lopez Court stressed that Congress'
authority under the Commerce Clause is generally limited to regulation
of economic behavior, stating "[w]here economic activity substantially
affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be
sllstained."202 In contrast, the Court was concerned that broadly reading
the Commerce Clause to include a wide range of non-economic activities
196. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 28182 (1981) (holding the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 regulation of
surface mines that primarily affected intrastate environmental quality was valid under the
Commerce Clause to prevent ruinous competition among states that would likely lead to
inadequate environmental standards); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.
241, 262 (1964) (holding civil rights statute prohibiting racial discrimination in public
accommodations substantially affected interstate commerce and was thus within congressional
power under Commerce Clause); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding statute
regulating intrastate production of wheat because home consumption nevertheless affected
interstate trade in product); Brignac, supra note 92 at 874; Oral & Phillips, supra note 91, at
10413; Mank, supra note 62, at 737.
197. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion, joined by
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas. /d. at 550. The same five justices were in the
majority in the Morrison and SWANCC, which are discussed below. See supra note 2 and infra
notes 205, 217. 273 and accompanying text. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer
dissented in Lopez, Morrison and SWANCC.
198. 18 U.S.c. § 922(q) (2003).
199. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; Mank, supra note 62, at 723 n.2, 738-40.
200. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
201. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558--59 (citations omitted); Mank, supra note 62, at 738.
202 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560; Mank. supra note 62, at 738-39.
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that have traditionally been regulated by states would undermine the
federal system of dual national and state sovereignty.203
Similarly, in the 2000 decision United States v. Morrison,204 the Court
held that a federal statute criminalizing intrastate, gender-based, violent
behavior exceeded Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause by
impinging on traditional state authority over criminal matters. 20S The
Violence Against Women Act (V A WA) created a "right to be free from
crimes of violence motivated by gender" and provided a civil damages
remedy for victims of gender-based violence. 206 The Morrison Court held
that, despite congressional findings about the effects of gender-based
violence on the national economy, the V A WA was beyond the scope of
the Commerce Clause because gender-based violence is primarily noneconomic and only indirectly affects interstate commerce. 2OO Based on
federalist concerns, the Court refused to consider congressional findings
relating to the aggregate economic effects of non-economic violent crime
on interstate commerce. The Court was concerned that Congress could
abuse the aggregation of non-economic activities under the Commerce
Clause to enact legislation that would "completely obliterate the
Constitution's distinction between national and local authority.,,208
After the Lopez and Morrison decisions, the authority of the Corps
to enforce the Migratory Bird "Rule" came into question. Before Lopez,
most lower courts found the Corps' Migratory Bird "Rule" to be valid
because the courts assumed that Congress intended in the 1972 Act to
exercise its full authority under the Commerce Clause. 209 In 1995, after
deciding Lopez, the Supreme Court denied certiorari to review a preLopez Ninth Circuit case that approved the Migratory Bird "Rule" under
a broad interpretation of the commerce power. 210 However, Justice
Thomas dissented from the denial of certiorari, questioning whether the
203. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557-59, 576-83 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Mank, supra note 62,
at 739-41.
204. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
205. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas. Id. at 600: Mank, supra note 62, at 742-44. Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer again dissented in Morrison. 529 U.S. at 628--36 (Souter. J.,
dissenting) .
206. 42 U.S.c. § 13981 (1994); Mank, supra note 62, at 742.
207. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613-19; Mank, supra note 62, at 742-44. The Court also held that
Congress lacked authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact Section
13981, but that issue is beyond the scope of this Article. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619-27.
208. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-17; Mank, supra note 62, at 743.
209. See, e.g., Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1392-96 (9th Cir. 1995), eert.
denied sub. nom. Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 955 (1995); Albrecht & Nickelsburg,
supra note 8, at 11052; Craig, supra note 32, at 10514-15
210. See Leslie Salt, 55 F.3d at 1392-96; Craig, supra note 32, at 10515; Tanya M. White &
Patrick R. Douglas, Case Note, Postponing the Inevitable: The Supreme Court Avoids Deciding
Whether the Migratory Bird Rule Passes Commerce Clause Muster, 9 Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'y
REV. 9, 13 (2001).
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Corps was regulating wetlands without proof that use by migratory birds
substantially affected interstate commerce. 2l1 In the 1997 decision United
States v. Wilson,212 the Fourth Circuit appeared to follow Justice Thomas'
criticisms. The court held that, in light of Lopez, both the Migratory Bird
"Rule" and all of subsection (a)(3) of the Corps' definition of "waters of
the United States" unconstitutionally exceeded the scope of the
commerce power because the regulation "requires neither that the
regulated activity have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, nor
that the covered waters have any sort of nexus with navigable, or even
interstate, waters."213 While suggesting that the Migratory Bird "Rule"
probably exceeded the scope of Congress' authority under the Commerce
Clause, the Fourth Circuit did not prohibit the Corps from regulating
isolated waters that actually had an impact on interstate or foreign
commerce, and the Corps continued to regulate isolated waters with such
impacts in the Fourth Circuit. 214 In dicta, the Fourth Circuit offered some
thoughts on the outer limit of congressional authority to regulate
intrastate waters, arguing that it may even extend to "discharge of
pollutants into any waters that [] flow across state lines, or connect to
waters that do so, regardless of whether such waters are navigable in
fact. "215 Subsequently, in the appellate decision for SWANCC, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the Migratory
Bird "Rule," but then the Supreme Court reversed. 216
B.

SWANCC: The Majority Opinion

In the SWANCC opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist held that the
Migratory Bird "Rule" was invalid because the Corps exceeded its
statutory authority under the Act. 217 The Court concluded that the term

211. See Cargill, Inc., 516 U.S. at 959 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Craig, supra note 32, at 10515;
White & Douglas, supra note 210, at 13.
212. 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997).
213. Id. at 257; Craig, supra note 32, at 10515; White & Douglas, supra note 210, at 14.
214. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (EPA) & U.S. ARMY CORPS OF
ENG'RS (CORPS), GUIDANCE FOR CORPS AND EPA FIELD OFFICES REGARDING CLEAN
WATER ACT SECTION 404 JURISDICfION OVER ISOLATED WATERS IN LIGHT OF UNITED
STATES V. WILSON, §§ 1,4. (stating the EPA and the Corps in the Fourth Circuit will regulate
only isolated waters that have actual connections to interstate or foreign commerce) (1998,
withdrawn January 19,2001), available at www.epa.gov/earth1r6/6en/w/wilguid.pdf(1998 Wilson
guidance); EPA & ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, GUIDANCE FOR CORPS AND EPA FIELD
OFFICES REGARDING CLEAN WATER ACT SECTION 404 JURISDICTION OVER ISOLATED
WATERS IN LIGHT OF UNITED STATES V. JAMES 1. WILSON (Jan. 19, 2001), available at
www.aswm.orglfwp/swancc/wdrawal.htm(2001noticeofwithdrawal);Johnson.supranote3.at
10699 n.4, 10676; White & Douglas, supra note 210, at 14.
215. See United States Y. Wilson. 133 F.3d 251, 256 (1997); Craig, supra note 32, at 10515.
216. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. Corps of Eng'rs, 191 F.3d 845, 852-53
(7th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 531 U.S. 159 (2001); Craig, supra note 32, at 10515-16.
217. SWANCC, supra note 2, at 172-74.
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"navigable waters" does not include "isolated" wetlands or waters.2IH The
Court read the Corps' authority under the Act narrowly to preserve
states' primary role in regulating non-navigable waters. The Court
interpreted the Conference Committee's language extending the Act's
jurisdiction to require the broadest possible constitutional authority over
traditional navigable waters and not the broadest jurisdiction under the
Commerce Clause.219 The Court did not decide whether Congress would
have authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate isolated
wetlands. 220 Nor did the Court provide a clear definition of which nonnavigable waters the FWPCA's jurisdiction covers.221
The SWANCC Court rejected the government's assertion that
Riverside Bayview's limitation of traditional navigation principles
supported the Corps' broad reading of the term "navigable waters" to
include isolated, intrastate waters.222 In Riverside Bayview, the Supreme
Court stated that the term "navigable" is of "limited import" and that
Congress sought to "regulate at least some waters that would not be
deemed 'navigable' under the classical understanding of that term."223
The government contended that the term "some waters" could include
isolated waters, but the SWANCC Court observed that it was "also
plausible ... that Congress simply wanted to include all waters adjacent
to 'navigable waters,' such as non-navigable tributaries and streams."224
The SWANCC Court maintained that both Congress and the Court's
precedent had always made navigability an essential basis for the Act's
jurisdiction. Putting a limit on the Riverside Bayview decision, the Court
found that
it is one thing to give a word limited effect and quite another to give it
no effect whatever. The term 'navigable' has at least the import of
showing us what Congress had in mind as its authority for enacting
the [FWPCA]: its traditional jurisdiction over waters that were or had
been navigable in fact or which could reasonably be so made. 225
The Court clearly implied that Section 404 of the FWPCA, requiring
a permit prior to discharging, primarily relies on navigability as the test
for jurisdiction.22~

218.
219.
11053.
220.
221.
222
223.
224.
225.
(1940)).
226.

[d. at 170-74; see 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2003); Moiseyev, supra note 189, at 194.
See SWANCC, supra note 2 at 168 n.3; Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 8, at 11042,
See infra notes 240-50, 268-71 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 265-67 and accompanying text.
SWANCC, supra note 2, at 167-68.
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121,133 (1985).
See SWANCC, supra note 2, at 171.
[d. at 172 (citing United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 407-408
See [d. at 173.
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The SWANCC Court thus interpreted Riverside Bayview as a narrow
exception to the FWPCA's primary reliance on navigability as the test for
federal jurisdiction over interstate waters. 227 According to the SWANCC
Court, Riverside Bayview accepted federal regulation over adjacent
wetlands because of the wetlands' close relationship, or "significant
nexus," to navigable waters. 228 The SWANCC Court expressly found that
"the text of the [FWPCA] does not allow" the Corps to regulate
discharges of fill material into wetlands that are not adjacent to bodies of
open water. 229 While SWANCC's narrow interpretation of Riverside
Bayview is questionable, Chief Justice Rehnquist's concern with
navigability in SWANCC is clearly at odds with his view twenty-two years
earlier in Kaiser Aetna that navigability was far less important than
regulation of commerce in defining the limits of congressional
authority. 230
In light of its traditional reluctance to interpret congressional
inaction as evidence of acquiescence to existing regulations, the Court
rejected the government's argument that Congress' failure to amend the
definition of "navigable waters" in the 1977 Amendments demonstrated
legislative acquiescence to the Corps' 1977 regulations?31 By contrast, in
Riverside Bayview, the Court concluded that Congress acquiesced to the
Corps' regulation of adjacent wetlands in 1977 when a House Bill that
would have narrowed the Act's jurisdiction over waters was rejected in
the Senate and not adopted by the Conference Committee.232 The
government in SWANCC made the same argument, noting Congress'
failure to legislatively overturn the 1975 decision by the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia in Natural Resources Defense
Council v. CallawaY,233 which concluded that the Corps must issue new
regulations expanding its Section 404 jurisdiction over non-navigable
waters. 234 Observing that "[f]ailed legislative proposals are a particularly
dangerous ground on which to rest an interpretation of a prior statute,"
the Court determined that "[h]ere, respondents have failed to make the
necessary showing that Congress' failure to pass legislation demonstrates
acquiescence to the 1977 regulations or the 1986 Migratory Bird Rule."235

227.
228.

/d. at 167-73.
Id. at 167.
229. [d. at 167-fl8.
230. 444 U.S. 164, 173-74 (1979); see supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
231. See SWANCC, supra note 2, at 169-71, & n.7; Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 8, at
11051 n.85, 11054.
232. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 136--39 (1985); supra
notes 148--50 and accompanying text.
233. 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975); Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 8, at 11054.
234. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. at 686.
235. See SWANCC, supra note 2, at 169-70.
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The Court rejected the government's argument because Section
404(g)(1) of the 1977 regulations does not define the term "other
waters."236 The government argued that evidence indicated that in 1977,
Congress sought to regulate non-navigable, isolated waters by adding
Section 404(g)(1) to the FWPCA.237 While the government contended
that "other waters" refers to isolated waters, the Court concluded that it
was equally plausible that "Congress simply wanted to include all waters
adjacent to 'navigable waters,' such as non-navigable tributaries and
streams. "238 Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that Section
404(g)(1) did not provide a clear answer regarding the meaning of the
term "navigable waters" in the general definition section of the Act,
Section 502(7).239
Although it did not ultimately decide whether Congress has
authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate isolated waters, the
Court questioned the government's argument that the regulation was
within the scope of the congressional commerce power. 240 Citing Lopez
and Morrison, the SWANCC Court observed that Congress' authority
under the Commerce Clause, "though broad, is not unlimited."241 The
Corps argued that the Migratory Bird "Rule" fell within congressional
power under the Commerce Clause to regulate activities that
"substantially affect" interstate commerce because the birds generate
over a billion dollars per year in recreational activities. However, the
Court found that the Corps had not clearly specified the "precise object
or activity that, in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate
commerce. ,,242 Despite prior decisions stating that protection of migratory
birds was a "national interest of very nearly the first magnitude,,,243 the
Court found unclear whether regulation of isolated waters and wetlands
"in the aggregate" affected interstate commerce. 244 The Corps initially
argued that it had authority to regulate the petitioner's land because it
236. See id. at 171; Craig, supra note 32, at 10518.
237. Section 404(g)(1) limits state regulation to waters:
other than those waters which are presently used, or are susceptible to use in their
natural condition or by reasonable improvement as a means to transport interstate or
foreign commerce shoreward to their ordinary high water mark, including all waters
which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide shoreward to their mean high water
mark, or mean higher high water mark on the west coast, including wetlands adjacent
thereto.
33 U.S.c. § 1344(g)(1) (2003); see SWANCC, supra note 2, at 169 (discussing 33 U.S.c. §
1344(g)(1»; Craig, supra note 32, at 10518.
238. See SWANCC, supra note 2, at 171; Craig, supra note 32, at 10518.
239. See SWANCC, supra note 2, at 171.
240, [d. at 173-74
241. [d. at 173.
242, [d.
243. [d. (citing Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920».
244. [d.; Moiseyev, supra note 189, at 195.
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"contain[ed] water areas used as habitat by migratory birds," but then the
Corps shifted its argument to emphasize the economic and commercial
value of petitioner's municipal landfil1. 245 The Court questioned the
Corps' attempt to use the full scope of the Commerce Clause as the basis
for the FWPCA's jurisdiction because "this is a far cry, indeed, from the
'navigable waters' and 'waters of the United States' to which the statute
by its terms extends."246
Underlying the Court's questions about whether the Commerce
Clause justified federal regulation of isolated waters was a federalism
concern for protecting "States' traditional and primary power over land
and water use.,,247 The Court emphasized that in Section 1251(b) of the
FWPCA
Congress chose to "recognize, preserve, and protect the primary
responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate
pollution, to plan the development and use (including restoration,
preservation, and enhancement) of land and water resources, and to
consult with the Administrator in the exercise of his authority under
this chapter. ,,248
To protect the primary role of the states, especially in regulating
non-navigable waters, the Court read the Corps' jurisdiction narrowly to
primarily encompass navigable waters as well as adjacent wetlands and
tributaries having a close relationship to them. While the Court did not
directly rely on Lopez and Morrison in addressing the issue of preserving
traditional state police powers, the SWANCC decision reflects similar
federalism concerns in limiting federal regulation over a traditional area
of state control-isolated waters. 249 Because there was no clear statement
in the Act indicating that Congress wished to give the federal government
authority over isolated wetlands, the Court refused to interpret the Act
broadly to include "federal jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats faIling
within the 'Migratory Bird Rule' [that] would result in a significant
impingement of the States' traditional and primary power over land and
water use. "250

245. SWANCC, supra note 2, at 173.
246. Jd.: Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 8, at 11053.
247. See SWANCC, supra note 2, at 172-74 (citing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349
(1971» ("[U]nless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have
significantly changed the federal-state balance"); Oral & Phillips, supra note 91, at 10421;
Johnson, supra note 3, at 10673.
248. SWANCC, supra note 2, at 166--67 (quoting 33 U.S.c. § 1251(b»; see Craig, supra note
32, at 10517-19.
24'!. See Mank,supra note 62, at 748-49; infra notes 257-59 and accompanying text.
250. SWANCC, supra note 2, at 174 (citing Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513
U.S. 30, 44 (1994) ("[R]egulation of land use [is] a function traditionally performed by local
governments") ).
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In SWANCC, the Court ignored evidence that Congress intended
the Act to include shared state and federal authority over many nonnavigable waters, with the states taking the primary role as long as they
sought to fulfill the Act's ecological goals. 251 While Section 1251(b)
provides that states will take the primary role in reducing pollution and
issuing permits, the 1972 Act also gave the federal government a greater
role in providing technical and financial assistance to states so they could
achieve the Act's ultimate goal of eliminating all water pollution by
1985.252 Furthermore, the Act's legislative history anticipates a federalstate balance of responsibility for implementing the permit system. The
Act implies that the federal government will only defer to states that
establish effective permit programs that are "superior" to the federal
program. 253
The [new] permit system establishes a direct link between the Federal
government and each industrial source of discharge into the navigable
waters .... The legislation will restore Federal-State balance to the
permit system. Talents and capacities of those States whose own
programs are superior are to be called upon to administer the permit
system within their boundaries. The Administrator is to suspend his
activity, insofar as the permit system is concerned, in these States. 254
The SWANCC Court also rejected the government's argument that
the Corps' interpretation was entitled to deference under the Chevron
doctrine, which states that courts should usually defer to an agency's
reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute for which Congress has
delegated authority to the agency. Because the Court concluded that
"[w]e find § 404(a) to be clear" and, "even were we to agree with
respondents [that the statute is ambiguous], we would not extend
Chevron deference here.,,255 Additionally, The Court applies an exception
to the doctrine when an agency's interpretation raises serious
constitutional questions; in such circumstances, the Court places the
burden of proof on an agency to demonstrate that Congress intended a
statute to reach the broadest limits of congressional authority under the
Constitution. 256 Thus, the burden of proof was on the Corps to
251. See Craig, supra note 32, at 10508-10,10518-20.
252. See 33 u.s.c. § 1251(b) (2003) (giving states primary role in reducing pollution,
managing construction grants and implementing permit programs with federal government
providing technical and financial assistance); Craig, supra note 32, at 10508-10, 10518-20.
253. See Craig, supra note 32, at 10508-10, 10518-20; supra note 252 and infra note 254 and
accompanying text.
254. S. REP. NO. 92-414 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3675; see also E.!.
DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 528 F.2d 1136, 1137-38 (4th Cir. 1975), affd, 430 U.S. 112
(1977) (discussing the 1972 Act and greater federal role in Act); Craig, supra note 32, at 10519.
255. SWANCC, supra note 2, at 174.
256. See SWANCC, supra note 2, at 172-74; Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (holding that courts should defer to an agency's
interpretation of a statute for which Congress has delegated authority if the statute is ambiguous
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demonstrate that Congress intended the FWPCA to reach the broadest
limits of congressional authority under the Constitution and the Court
concluded that the Corps failed to carry that burden. The Court thus
refused to defer under the Chevron doctrine to the Corps' interpretation
of the statute. 257 To preserve traditional state regulation of isolated waters
and wetlands, the Court returned to its traditional emphasis on
navigability in determining federal jurisdiction over waters. Thus, the
Court "read the statute as written to avoid the significant constitutional
and federalism questions raised by respondents' interpretation, and
therefore reject the request for administrative dderence."258 The Court
stated:
Where an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer
limits of Congress' power, we expect a clear indication that Congress
intended that result. This requirement stems from our prudential
desire not to needlessly reach constitutional issues and our
assumption that Congress does not casually authorize administrative
agencies to interpret a statute to push the limit of congressional
authority. This concern is heightened where the administrative
interpretation alters the federal-state framework by permitting
federal encroachment upon a traditional state power. Thus, "where
an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious
constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid
such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the
intent of Congress." 259
Furthermore, the Court concluded that the Migratory Bird "Rule"
was not entitled to deference because it contradicted the Corps' original
1974 interpretation of the FWPCA that defined the Act's jurisdiction as
waters that are presently used, have been used, or could be used by the
public for transportation or interstate commerce. 260 The Court observed

and the agency"s interpretation is permissible, or, in other words, reasonable); see infra notes
263, 476 and accompanying text. To avoid constitutional questions, however, the Court applies
an exception to the Chevron doctrine. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 574-75 (1988); Bradford C. Mank, Textualism's
Selective Canons of Statutory Construction, 86 Ky. L.J. 527, 571-75 (1997-98): Thomas W.
Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 914-15 (2001) (arguing
exception to Chevron should apply only if statute actually violates Constitution); infra note 259
and accompanying text. Some commentators have argued that the Court did not apply the
DeBartolo exception to Chevron consistently in a controversial abortion case, Rust v. Sullivan,
500 U.S. 173, 181H!7 (1991) (holding agency's interpretation of statute entitled to deference
despite serious constitutional questions); Mank, supra note 62, at 573-75 (discussing
inconsistency between DeBartolo and Rust).
257. SWANCC, supra note 2, at 172-74 (citing Edward 1. DeBartolo Corp., 485 U.S. at 575);
Moiseyev, supra note 189, at 195.
258. SWANCC, supra note 2, at 174.
259. [d. at 172-73 (internal citations omitted).
260. The SWANCC Court summarized the Corps 1974 regulations:
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that "the Corps' original interpretation of the [FWPCA], promulgated
two years after its enactment, is inconsistent with that which it espouses
here.,,261 The Court concluded that the government "put forward no
persuasive evidence that the Corps mistook Congress' intent in 1974."262
The SWANCC Court's refusal to consider the Corps' evolving
interpretation of the FWPCA's jurisdiction is inconsistent with other
decisions by the Court recognizing that an agency may change its
interpretation of an ambiguous statute for which Congress has delegated
rule making authority to the agency.263 Additionally, the Court ignored
the fact that the EPA, which has final authority over Section 404 and the
entire FWPCA, has consistently interpreted the statute to reach
Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause since 1973. 264
The actual impact of the SWANCC opinion remains uncertain
because the line between isolated, purely intrastate wetlands and
wetlands adjacent to navigable waters covered by the [FWPCA] is often
unclear and depends in part on how the Corps and the EPA define the
term "wetlands" and "navigable waters."265 The Court did not clarify
whether it intended to create a new test for establishing which nonnavigable waters are sufficiently related to navigable waters so that the
Act covers them. Instead, the Court distinguished SWANCC from
Riverside Bayview by explaining Riverside Bayview as a case involving a
"significant nexus,,266 between the adjacent wetlands and navigable

Its 1974 regulations defined § 404(a)'s 'navigable waters' to mean 'those waters of the
United States whieh are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, and/or are presently,
or have been in the past, or may be in the future susceptible for use for purposes of
interstate or foreign commerce.' 33 CFR § 209,120(d)(I). The Corps emphasized that
'lilt is the water body's capability of use by the public for purposes of transportation
or commerce which is the determinative factor.' § 209.260(e)(I).
SWANCC, supra note 2, at 168; Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 8, at 11053-54.
261. SWANCC, supra note 2, at 168.
262 [d.; Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 8, at 11053-54.
263. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45, 86465 (1984) (concluding EPA could change its interpretation of the term "stationary source" in the
Clean Air Act).
264. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
265. See Robin Kundis Craig. Lower Courts Untangle the Finer Points of SW ANCC
Decision, 24 NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL.7, 7-8 (Sept.-Oct. 2002) (stating "the SWANCC Court
left the exact parameters of the Corps' jurisdiction over wetlands that fall between these two
poles [those adjacent to open water and isolated wetlands regulated solely because of migratory
birds] unclear, particularly regarding what qualifies as 'adjacency' or a 'significant nexus'''):
Funk, supra note 3, at 10743-45, 10771-72 (arguing future of wetlands regulation is uncertain
because the definition of adjacent wetland is not clear); Johnson, supra note 3, at 10676-77
(same); see Tobias Halvarson, Note, Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers: The Failure of "Navigability" as a Proxy in Demarcating
Federal Jurisdiccion For Environmental Protection, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 181, 193 (2002)
("SWANCC's implications are uncertain, thanks primarily to the large zone of ambiguity left by
the Court. ").
266. SWANCC, supra note 2, at 167-68.
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waters. 267 Furthermore, the Court did not identify the constitutional limits
of congressional authority over isolated, non-navigable intrastate
wetlands that affect interstate commerce. 268 Unlike the Fourth Circuit's
decision in Wilson,269 the SWANCC decision did not directly address
whether Congress had authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate
isolated wetlands, although the Court suggested that the answer might be
no.270 Thus, the Court did not determine whether Congress would have
the authority under the Commerce Clause to enact the Migratory Bird
"Rule" as a statute. Justice Stevens argued in his dissent that tourism and
hunting activities connected to migratory birds have a substantial effect
on interstate commerce.271 The majority opinion in SWANCC, however,
suggested that a majority of the Court did not find this argument
persuasive.

C.

SWANCC: Justice Stevens' Dissent

In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens, who was joined by Justices
Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer, made a strong case that Congress intended
the FWPCA to reach the limits of congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause and that the Corps had the authority under the statute
to issue the Migratory Bird "Rule." He argued that the majority's narrow
interpretation of the Act's jurisdiction was based "on two equally
untenable premises: (1) that when Congress passed the 1972 [FWPCA], it
did not intend 'to exert anything more than its commerce power over
navigation,' and (2) that in 1972 Congress drew the boundary defining the
Corps' jurisdiction at the odd line on which the Court today settles."272
Justice Stevens argued that the Corps' interpretation of the term "waters
of the United States" to include isolated, non-navigable intrastate
wetlands was consistent with Congress' intent in the 1972 Act, or at the
least, that Congress acquiesced in the 1977 FWPCA amendments to the
Corps' broader 1977 regulations. 273
Justice Stevens suggested that the Court should interpret the 1972
Act's jurisdiction in light of its ambitious goals and missions. The goal of
the 1899 Act was to protect waters from obstructions to navigation. Thus,
the corresponding jurisdiction was limited to navigable waters. By

267. See supra notes 225-29 and accompanying text.
268. See Weinberg, supra note 72, at 533 (stating SWANCC avoided constitutional issue of
whether Congress has authority to protected isolated wetlands under the Commerce Clause).
269. See supra notes 212-15 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 240-50 and accompanying text.
271. See generally Weinberg, supra note 72, at 533-47 (arguing Congress has authority to
protected isolated wetlands under the Commerce Clause); infra notes 288--95 and accompanying
text.
272. SWANCC,supra note 2, at 177.
273. [d. at 175-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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contrast, in the 1972 Act, Congress expanded the goal to achieving zero
water pollution by 1985 274 and "broadened the Corps' mission to include
the purpose of protecting the quality of our Nation's waters for esthetic,
health, recreational, and environmental uses.'>27S Justice Stevens
presented evidence that the 1972 Act represented a significant "shift in
the focus of federal water regulation from protecting navigability toward
environmental protection ... ."276 He argued that Congress intended the
1972 Act to be a "comprehensive" statute going far beyond the 1899
Act's restrictive emphasis on navigation to the far broader goal of
improving water quality.277 To fulfill these goals, Congress had
intentionally expanded the 1972 Act's jurisdiction beyond navigable-infact waters to include "all of 'the waters of the United States, including
the territorial seas",278 and requiring "neither actual nor potential
navigability.'>279 In arguing that Congress intended the 1972 Act's
jurisdiction to extend beyond navigable waters, he stated that "although
Congress opted to carryover the traditional jurisdictional term 'navigable
waters' from the [1899 Act] and prior versions of the FWPCA, it
broadened the definition of that term to encompass all 'waters of the
United States.',,280 Justice Stevens noted that "the 1972 conferees arrived
at the final formulation by specifically deleting the word 'navigable' from
the definition that had originally appeared in the House version of the
Act. The majority today undoes that deletion. ,,2Rl He maintained that the
1972 Act's jurisdiction included isolated wetlands because the Act's text
and legislative history, especially the conference report's reference to
"the broadest possible constitutional interpretation, unencumbered by
agency determinations," demonstrated that Congress intended the 1972
Act to be a "comprehensive" statute that would reach more broadly than
the 1899 Act.2~2 He criticized the majority's attempt to use the Corps'
initially restrictive interpretation of the Act's jurisdiction because the
EPA had immediately attacked that interpretation as flawed, and
contended that the Court should have deferred to the Corps' recognition
that its 1974 regulations unnecessarily limited the statute's jurisdiction. 283
Justice Stevens argued that Congress had acquiesced in 1977 to the
Corps' 1977 regulations permitting jurisdiction over isolated, nonnavigable waters by refusing to adopt amendments that would have
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 175 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1251a).
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at

179.
179-82.
175 (quoting 33 U.S.c. § 1362(7».
175.
180.
180-81.
181 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
183-84 & n.8.
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rejected the Corps' 1977 regulations interpreting the Act's jurisdiction as
reaching the limits of the Commerce Clause.284 Justice Stevens suggested
that the majority's claim that Congress acquiesced to the Corps'
regulation of adjacent wetlands but not other waters was a misreading of
Riverside Bayview's rationale,285 because the evidence of congressional
acquiescence to the Corps' regulations was similar for adjacent wetlands
and isolated, intrastate waters affecting interstate commerce.
Additionally, the legislative history indicated that Congress was aware of
and approved of the Corps' regulation of phase three waters, which
include the isolated wetlands at issue in SWANCC. 286 Given the statutory
ambiguity, Justice Stevens contended that the majority should have
deferred to the Corps' reasonable interpretation of the term "navigable
waters" in the FWPCA to include isolated intrastate wetlands. 287
Justice Stevens also noted that "[t]he Corps' exercise of its [Section]
404 permitting power over 'isolated' waters that serve as habitat for
migratory birds falls well within the boundaries set by this Court's
Commerce Clause jurisprudence.,,288 He argued that while the Court in
Lopez and Morrison refused to allow federal regulation of criminal
behavior traditionally regulated by the states, the regulation of isolated
wetlands is proper under the Commerce Clause because "the discharge of
fill material into the Nation's waters is almost always undertaken for
economic reasons."Z89 Justice Stevens asserted that the destruction of
isolated wetlands substantially affects interstate commerce because it
significantly harms the migratory bird population in the aggregate and

[d. at 185-90.
285. [d. at 186-9l.
286. Justice Stevens stated:
The Conference Report discussing the 1977 amendments. for example, states that §
404(g) "establish[es] a process to allow the Governor of any State to administer an
individual and general permit program for the discharge of dredged or fill material
into phase 2 and 3 waters after the approval of a program by the Administrator." H.R.
CONF. REP. NO. 95·830, p. 101 (1977), U.S. Code Congo & Admin. News 1977 pp.
4326, 4476. reprinted in 3 Legislative History of the Clean Water Act of 1977
(Committee Print compiled for the Committee on Environment and Public Works by
the Library of Congress). Ser. No. 95-14, p. 285 (emphasis added) (hereinafter Leg.
His!. of CWA). Similarly, a Senate Report discussing the 1977 amendments explains
that, under § 404(g), "the [C]orps will continue to administer the section 404 permit
program in all navigable waters for a discharge of dredge or fill material until the
approval of a State program tor phase 2 and 3 waters." S. REP. No. 95-370, p. 75
(1977), U.S. Code Congo & Admin. News 1977 pp. 4326, 4400. reprinted in 4 Leg. Hist.
of CW A 708 (emphases added).
SWANCC, supra note 2, at 189 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
287. [d. at 191-92; Moiseyev, supra note 189, at 195-96.
288. SWANCC, supra note 2, at 192.
289. [d. at 192-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Moiseyev, supra note 189, at 196.
284.
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reduces tourism. 290 He argued that federal regulation of isolated wetlands
was appropriate because "the causal connection between the filling of
wetlands and the decline of commercial activities associated with
migratory birds is not 'attenuated,'291 [but] is direct and concrete."292 In
addition, the Migratory Bird "Rule" did not "blur the 'distinction
between what is truly national and what is truly local'" because, as Justice
Holmes recognized in Missouri v. Holland,293 protecting migratory birds is
a national problem requiring federal regulation. 294 Justice Stevens
maintained that regulation of intrastate isolated wetlands to protect
interstate migratory birds substantially affects interstate commerce and is
consistent with the modern judicial understanding of the Commerce
Clause. 295
Moreover, Justice Stevens suggested that the majority'S opinion was
inconsistent with the underlying rationale of Riverside Bayview. 296 The
wetland that the Riverside Bayview Court had characterized as
"adjacent," and thus within the scope of the Act, was an isolated wetland
similar to the wetlands at issue in SWANCC. He pointed out that the
wetland in Riverside Bayview "was not itself navigable, directly adjacent
to navigable water, or even hydrologically connected to navigable water,
but [] was part of a larger area, characterized by poor drainage, that
ultimately abutted a navigable creek."297 Justice Stevens found no
compelling reason to distinguish between "isolated" wetlands and
290. SWANCC, supra note 2, at 192-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Moiseyev, supra note 189,
at 196.
291. SWANCC, supra note 2, at 192-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612 (2000».
292 SWANCC, supra note 2, at 192-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214
F.3d 483, 492-93 (4th Cir. 2000»; Moiseyev, supra note 189, at 196.
293. 252 U.S. 416,435 (1920).
294. SWANCC, supra note 2, at 195-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Morrison, 529 U.S.,
at 617- 18); Weinberg, supra note 72, at 534, 543 (discussing Missouri v. Holland and Justice
Stevens' dissent in SWANCC).
295. SWANCC, supra note 2, at 192-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Weinberg, supra note 72, at
536-43 (discussing Justice Stevens' dissent in SWANCC and arguing Commerce Clause gives
Congress authority to regulate isolated wetlands).
296. SWANCC, supra note 2, at 176, 186-87, 191.
297. [d. at 175-76. In a footnote, Justice Stevens further explained why there was no
hydrological connection, stating:
The district court in Riverside Bayview found that there was no direct "hydrological"
connection between the parcel at issue and any nearby navigable waters. App. to Pet.
for Cert. in Riverside Bayview [at] 25a. The wetlands characteristics of the parcel were
due, not to a surface or groundwater connection to any actually navigable water, but
to "poor drainage" resulting from "the Lamson soil that underlay the property." Brief
for Respondent in Riverside Bayview [at] 7. Nevertheless, this Court found occasional
surface runoff from the property into nearby waters to constitute a meaningful
connection. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 134; Brief for United States in Riverside
Bayview 8, n. 7.
SWANCC, supra note 2, at 176 n.2.
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"adjacent" wetlands because "once Congress crossed the legal watershed
that separates navigable streams of commerce from marshes and inland
lakes, there is no principled reason for limiting the statute's protection to
those waters or wetlands that happen to lie near a navigable stream."298
He observed that the Riverside Bayview Court emphasized "the
ecological connection between the wetlands and the nearby waters" and
contended that "[b]oth [hydrological and ecological] types of connections
are also present in many, and possibly most, 'isolated' waters.,,299 Relying
on Riverside Bayview, Justice Stevens suggested that Congress intended
to use its Commerce Clause authority to reach many non-navigable
waters, including isolated wetlands, that have significant ecological or
hydrological connections to the nation's waters. 300 Accordingly, Justice
Stevens made a powerful case that the majority had ignored Congress'
intent and at least the spirit of the Riverside Bayview decision by striking
down the Corps' Migratory Bird "Rule."
Justice Stevens' dissent suggested that the majority opinion had
rejected FWPCA jurisdiction over all isolated waters and not merely
those covered by the Migratory Bird "Rule."301 He found that with the
new jurisdictional line drawn by the Court, the Corps only maintained
jurisdiction over "actually navigable waters, their tributaries, and
wetlands adjacent to each.,,302 While Justice Stevens' dissent may expose
some of the unwritten assumptions of the majority, his characterization of
the majority opinion is clearly not binding on either the Court or the
lower courts. Furthermore, Justice Stevens' characterization of the scope
of the majority opinion does not define which tributaries are within the
Act and which wetlands are considered adjacent to navigable waters.
Unfortunately, Justice Stevens' dissent did not address the crucial issue of
the majority's use of the "significant nexus" standard. 303

D.

The EPA's and the Corps' 2001 loint Memorandum on SWANCC

On January 19, 2001, the EPA and the Corps released a joint
memorandum on the SWANCC decision that narrowly construed the
decision's impact on their jurisdiction. According to the joint
memorandum, the Court's holding invalidated the agencies' jurisdiction
over '''non-navigable, isolated, instrastate' [sic] waters based solely on the

298.
299.
Inc., 474
300.
301.
302.
303.

[d. at 176.
[d. at 176 n.2 (emphasis in original) (citing United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,
U.S. 121, 134-l35 (1985».
{d.
Id. at 176-77.
[d.
See Calderon, supra note 8, at 313-14 (discussing significant nexus test).
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use of such waters by migratory birds."3()4 The 2001 joint memorandum
conceded that the SWANCC decision applied not only to Section 404, but
also to "other provisions of the [FWPCA] as well."305 The 2001 joint
memorandum took an expansive view, however, of what waters may still
be covered by the Act after SWANCC. The memorandum emphasized
that SWANCC did not overrule the holding or rationale of Riverside
Bayview, which the memorandum contended had "upheld the regulation
of traditionally navigable waters, interstate waters, their tributaries and
wetlands adjacent to each."306 Further, even "waters that are isolated,
intrastate, and nonnavigable," may still be within the Act's jurisdiction "if
their use, degradation, or destruction could affect other 'waters of the
United States,' thus establishing a significant nexus between the water in
question and other 'waters of the United States."'307 The joint
memorandum's use of the "significant nexus" standard is obviously a
reference to its use in SWANCC. 308 By focusing only on the SWANCC
holding, the 2001 Jomt memorandum underplayed SWANCC's
significance in re-emphasizing navigability as the primary criterion in
defining the Act's jurisdiction. While its language is not clear, the 2001
joint memorandum arguably suggested that ecological impacts from
isolated waters on navigable waters satisfy the standard, even in the
absence of a hydrological connection. Justice Stevens supported this view
in his dissent, but the majority clearly rejected it. To the extent the 2001
joint memorandum suggested that truly isolated waters are still within the
jurisdiction of the federal government without any significant
hydrological connection to navigable waters, the memorandum's
reasoning is suspect. Nevertheless, the 2001 joint memorandum's narrow
reading of SWANCC was understandable in light of the agencies' mission
in achieving the Act's broad ecological goals.
The 2001 joint memorandum directed that "[w]ith respect to any
waters that fall outside of that category [i.e., nonnavigable, isolated,
intrastate waters], field staff should continue to exercise [FWPCA]
jurisdiction to the full extent of their authority under the statute and
regulations and consistent with court opinions. "309 The memorandum
advised staff to analyze on a case-by-case basis whether impoundments
304. Joint Memorandum, supra note 8, at 2; see Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 8, at
11042 & n.12.
305. See Joint Memorandum, supra note 8, at 1-2. In a footnote, the joint memorandum
states that SWANCC only applies to the Act and does not affect jurisdiction under other federal
statutes addressing "aquatic features" or affect state or tribal jurisdiction over "aquatic
features." [d. at 2 n.1.
306. [d. at 3 (citing Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 123, 129, 139); see also id. at 5-7
(discussing Riverside Bayview).
307. [d. at 5.
308. See supra notes 225-29 and accompanying text.
309. Joint Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3.
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of, tributaries of, or wetlands adjacent to subsection (a)(3) waters solely
affect commerce as migratory bird habitat, or whether those waters have
a significant nexus to navigable waters or whether the use, degradation or
destruction of those waters affects interstate or foreign commerce.31O
The impact of the agencies' narrow interpretation of the SWANCC
decision was short lived. As discussed III Part V, the Bush
administration's own joint memorandum supercedes the 2001
memorandum and the administration may make even more extensive
changes if it issues new rules concerning the Act's jurisdiction. 311
V.

A.

THE SPLIT IN THE COURTS SINCE SWANCC

Cases Reading the Act Narrowly and SWANCC Broadly

1. Rice: Subsurface Groundwater Does Not Constitute "Navigable
Waters"
In Rice v. Harken Exploration CO.,312 the Fifth Circuit held that

neither the Oil Pollution Act (OPA)3\3 nor the FWPCA314 apply to
contaminated groundwater without proof of a hydrological connection to
a navigable water. 315 The plaintiffs were the trustees of a trust that owned
the surface rights to a ranch that the defendant, Harken Exploration
Company (Harken), leased for oil exploration and drilling. 316 While
drilling for oil on dry land, Harken allegedly contaminated with oil the
ranch's soil, groundwater, and Big Creek, a small seasonal creek. 317 The
oil in the groundwater and in Big Creek allegedly reached the Canadian
River, a navigable water. 318
While finding that the plaintiffs presented significant evidence that
the defendant's oil discharges on the surface of the ranch land had

310. Id. at 5.
311. See supra notes 13-25 and infra notes 477-503 and accompanying text.
312. 250 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2001).
313. See generally 33 U.S.c. §§ 2701-2761 (2003); Kevin Batik, Note, OPA's Reach: The
Geographic Scope Of "Navigable Waters" Under The Oil Pollution Act Of 1990, 21 REV. LITIG.
419,421-23 (2002) (discussing Oil Pollution Act Of 1990).
314. See Rice, 250 F.3d at 269-70; Batik, supra note 313, at 432-33, 439-41 (discussing Rice);
see generally, Philip M. Quatrochi, Comment, Groundwater Jurisdiction Under the Clean Water
Act: The Tributary Groundwarer Dilemma, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 603 (1996) (discussing
conflicting cases regarding whether groundwater is within jurisdiction of FWPCA and arguing
that tributary groundwater is within Act's scope); infra notes 461-76 and accompanying text.
315. Because the definition of "navigable waters" is the same under the Act and OPA, the
Rice Court applied SWANCC's definition of that term to the OPA as well. See Rice, 250 F.3d at
267-69.
316. Id. at 265.
317. [d.
318. See id. at 265-66.
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contaminated the groundwater under the Big Creek Ranch, the Fifth
Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the oil
contaminated waters were protected under the OPA or FWPCA. 319 In a
prior decision, the Fifth Circuit clearly held that the FWPCA's
jurisdiction does not reach groundwater because the statute applies only
to surface waters. 320 Because the term "waters of the United States" is no
broader under the OPA than the Act, the court concluded that
subsurface waters are likewise outside the scope of the OPA. 321
Furthermore, the plaintiffs failed to prove that there was a "hydrological
connection between the groundwater and the Canadian River," other
than a general assertion in the report by the plaintiffs' expert that the
Canadian River is down gradient from the Big Creek Ranch.322 In
addition, the plaintiffs did not address flow rates into the river, or
estimate how much of the oil contamination in the groundwater would
reach the Canadian River.323 The Fifth Circuit broadly interpreted
SWANCC and narrowly construed the FWPCA to conclude "that a body
of water is subject to regulation under the [FWPCA1if the body of water
is actually navigable or is adjacent to an open body of navigable water."324
The plaintiffs failed to establish that Harken's activities caused the type
of direct discharges into navigable waters that fall within the jurisdiction
of the OPA or the Act because the trustees did not provide evidence of a
"close, direct and proximate link between Harken's discharges of oil" and
any resulting harm to navigable waters. 325
Given the absence of a clear hydrological connection from the
groundwater contamination to the Big Creek and then to the Canadian
River, the court likely reached the correct result. 326 Additionally,
Congress probably did not intend the Act or the OP A to reach

319.
320.

See id. at 272.
[d. at 269 (discussing Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d 1310, 1322 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding

legislative history of FWPCA clearly demonstrated Congress did not intend the Act to reach
subsurface waters)). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has also held
that groundwater is beyond the scope of the FWPCA. See Viii. of OconomowoC Lake v. Dayton
Hudson Corp., 24 F.3d 962, 965-66 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Weinberg, supra note 72, at 544
(agreeing with Rice decision that groundwater is beyond jurisdiction of FWPCA and OPAl. For
conflicting views in other circuits, see infra notes 461, 465. 471 and accompanying text.
321. Rice, 250 F.3d at 269. Because it concluded that neither the FWPCA nor the OPA's
jurisdiction includes groundwater, the Fifth Circuit arguably should not even have addressed the
facts of the case. Perhaps because of the conflicting views in other circuits and the possibility that
the Supreme Court might disagree on the issue of groundwater jurisdiction, the Fifth Circuit did
address the facts of the case. See supra note 320 and infra notes 461, 465, 471 (discussing conflict
law regarding whether groundwater is within jurisdiction of FWPCA).
322. See Rice, 250 F.3d at 272; Calderon, supra note 8, at 318-19.
323. See Rice, 250 F.3d at 272.
324. [d. at 269 (citing SWANCC).
325. [d. at 272.
326. [d. at 270--72.
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groundwater contamination that does not clearly impact surface waters. 327
The Rice decision's broad reading of SWANCC and narrow reading of
the Act can be limited to the facts in Rice; the hydrologic connection
between the defendant's activities and the nation's surface waters was
uncertain. 328

Judge Morgan Rejects the Corps 1986 Regulation in Newdunn
Associates and RGM

2.

In United States v. Newdunn Associates,329 Judge Morgan of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that
the Corps did not have jurisdiction under the Act when the hydrologic
connection to navigable waters consisted of man-made ditches and
culverts and miles of non-navigable waters. The defendant owned a fortythree acre parcel of land in Newport News, Virginia.330 The Corps sought
to enjoin the property owner from excavating or filling any wetlands on
its property in alleged violation of the Corps' wetlands regulations under
the Act. 33 ! The Corps claimed a hydrological connection existed between
the wetlands and navigable waters through a series of multiple drainage
ditches, a culvert under a highway, and miles of non-navigable waters. 332
After initially granting the Corps' request for a temporary restraining
order and then a preliminary injunction,333 the court concluded that the
Corps did not have jurisdiction under the Act to regulate the property
and entered judgment for the defendants. 334 The Fourth Circuit recently
reversed the district court's decision. 335
The Newdunn court rejected using man-made structures to establish
hydrological connections under the Act. 336 The court maintained that no
evidence supported granting the Corps' jurisdiction over drainage pipes
or culverts among navigable waters. 137 The district court also found that
327. See supra note 320 and infra notes 461, 465, 471 and accompanying text.
328. See Calderon, supra note 8, at 319.
329. 195 F. Supp. 2d 751 (E.D. Va. 2002), rev'd, Treacy v. Newdunn Assocs., 344 F.3d 407
(4th Cir. 2003), petition for cert. filed, 72 U.S.L.W. 3310 (U.S. Oct. 27, 2003) (No. 03-637).
330. [d. at 753.
331. ld. at 753.
332. Surface water leaving the property traveled for miles-via (1) a spur ditch; (2) the
eastern, man-made 1-64 drainage ditch; (3) a culvert under 1-64; (4) the western, man-made 1-64
drainage ditch (portions of which were indisputably constructed through "dry lands"); and (5)
non-navigable parts of Stoney Run -before finding navigable waters. [d. at 765.
333. [d. at 753.
334. !d. at 770-7l.
335. See infra notes 362-64 and accompanying text.
336. "The Corps relied at trial eXClusively on this 'surface water connection' or
'hydrological connection' for jurisdiction, although neither of those terms are included in even
the 1986 regulations." Newdunn, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 765; Liebesman & Turner, supra note 36, at
211 (discussing Newdunn Court's rejection of hydrological connection argument).
337. See Newdunn, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 765; Liebesman & Turner, supra note 36, at 211.
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defining a culvert or storm drain as a tributary was arbitrary, because
man-made construction or obstructions often block culverts or storm
drains, rendering the Corps' jurisdiction dependent on third party
actions. 338
Even if the Corps proved that the wetlands were within the
jurisdiction of the 1986 regulations, the court concluded that the Corps
did not have the authority to issue those regulations in the first place
because the Corps' interpretation of the Act exceeded the scope of
jurisdiction Congress intended when it passed the Act in 1972.339 While
the 1986 regulations generally exclude non-tidal drainage and irrigation
ditches excavated on dry land from the definition of tributaries, the
regulations give the Corps the discretion to determine on a case-by-case
basis whether such ditches or culverts constitute tributaries to waters of
the United States. 340 According to the court, Congress intended the 1972
Act to address only navigable waters. The Corps' 1986 regulations
defined "waters of the United States" far more broadly than navigable
waters and thus "usurped Congress' authority to determine the Corps'
jurisdiction. "341
Subsequently, in United States v. RGM,342 Judge Morgan held that
the Corps did not have jurisdiction over a 658-acre tract of land and
wetlands in Chesapeake, Virginia, where the only connections between
the wetlands on the property and navigable waters were man-made
drainage ditches and ephemeral streams. 343 According to the Corps'
regulations, "[t]he term adjacent means bordering, contiguous, or
neighboring. Wetlands separated from other waters of the United States
by man-made dikes or barriers, natural river berms, beach dunes and the
like are 'adjacent wetlands.,,'344 However, the court concluded that the
possibility that water from the wetlands might sometimes enter navigable
waters through drainage ditches and ephemeral streams was insufficient
to create jurisdiction under either the Corps' current regulations, or
under the Corps' pre-1986 regulations because the connection was too
tenuous to constitute a significant nexus under the SWANCC decision. 345
The RGM court determined that the Corps' current regulations
governing its jurisdiction over non-navigable, non-tidal waters were

338. See Newdunn, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 765; Liebesman & Turner, supra note 36, at 21l.
339. See Newdunn, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 765-67.
340. Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41206,
41217 (Nov. 13, 1986).
341. /d.
342. 222 F. Supp. 2d 780 (E.D. Va. 2002).
343. [d. at 787-89.
344. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d) (1985) (currently 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c) (2003»; see Bergstrom,
supra note 52, at 846.
345. ROM, 222 F. Supp. 2d at 787-89.
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invalid. 346 In determining jurisdiction over waters with intermittent flows,
the Corps regulations provide that, in the absence of adjacent wetlands,
the lateral limits of non-tidal waters extend to the OHWM.347 The
ordinary high water mark was originally based on the flow of navigable
waters. In 1975 however, the Corps eliminated this requirement. 348
Specifically, the Corps extended its jurisdiction to all non-navigable
waters that might tangentially or occasionally affect navigable waters. 349
Citing SWANCC, the district court found "that the Corps'
reinterpretation of the jurisdictional significance of an OHWM is not
entitled to Chevron deference, and is an invalid extension of [the] Corps'
jurisdiction. ,,350 The district court also found that the waters at issue did
not extend to the OHWM because the wetlands did not continuously
provide water to the navigable waters. The court also rejected the Corps'
expert testimony claiming that water flowed uphill from the wetlands to
create a high water mark from the property to navigable waters. 351 The
United States is appealing the case to the Fourth Circuit and is likely to
prevail in light of the Fourth Circuit's decisions in Deaton and
Newdunn.352
The Newdunn and RGM decisions were incorrectly decided. First,
the court was wrong in both cases to exclude man-made tributaries from
the Act's jurisdiction. The Corps' regulations properly recognize that
man-made changes can change the scope of its jurisdiction, but
appropriately require such changes to be "permanent," which likely
means something that will last for a number of years.353 In contrast to
Judge Morgan's decisions, the Eleventh Circuit in United States v.
Eidson 354 correctly held that Congress intended the Act to include manmade tributaries and not just natural ones. 355 Similarly, in the June 2002

346. See id. at 787.
347. See id. at 786-88; 33 C.F.R. § 328.4(c)(1) (2003); see also ANPRM, supra note 6, at 1997
(summarizing RGM).
348. See id.
349. See RGM, 222 F. Supp. 2d at 787.
350. See id. at 787-89: see also ANPRM, supra note 6, at 1997 (summarizing RGM).
351. See RGM, 222 F. Supp. 2d at 787-89 (questioning validity of 1986 Corps regulations
and concluding that wetlands at issue could not meet definition of even 1986 regulations); see
also ANPRM,supra note 6, at 1997.
352. See EPA, Office of Water, Wetlands home page, Post-SWANCC Caselaw on "Waters
of the United States," located at http:// www.epa.gov!owow!wetlands!CaselawI2303.pdf (listing
cases on appeal) (updated January 21, 2003); ANPRM, supra note 6, at 1997; infra notes 360-64
and accompanying text.
353. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.5 (2003) ("Man-made changes may affect the limits of waters of the
United States; however, permanent changes should not be presumed until the particular
circumstances have been examined and verified by the district engineer.").
354. 108 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 1997).
355. Id. at 1342.
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decision In the Matter of Ray and Jeanette Veldhuis,356 an EPA
administrative law judge concluded that a connection or nexus between
wetlands and navigable waters "is not precluded by the distances or
number of tributary connections involved, the intermittency of the
connection, or the fact that some tributaries may have been of human
construction."357 Second, the district court in RGM incorrectly required
the presence of a continuous OHWM and rejected the Corps' regulations
allowing just an intermittent flow. 358 As discussed below, the Ninth
Circuit in Headwaters v. Talent Irrigation District appropriately concluded
that intermittent flows from non-navigable tributaries could have
significant impacts on navigable waters. 359 As a matter of law, the district
court in RGM inappropriately excluded human-made hydrological
connections and intermittent connections without considering whether, in
some circumstances, they could have significant impacts on navigable
waters.
One commentator predicted that the Fourth Circuit would likely
reverse the Newdunn and RGM decisions. 360 Using reasoning clearly
inconsistent with the Newdunn and RGM decisions, the Fourth Circuit
held in the June 2003 decision United States v. Deaton that the Corps has
tributary jurisdiction over a roadside drainage ditch from which water
must pass through several other non-navigable watercourses before
reaching a navigable river. 361 On September 10, 2003, just before this
Article was published, the Fourth Circuit did in fact reverse the district
court's Newdunn decision. 362 Following its reasoning in Deaton, the
Fourth Circuit rejected the district court's conclusion that the Corps may
not assert tributary jurisdiction over man-made ditches. Further, the
court determined that the 1-64 ditch that connected the Newdunn
Property's wetlands with navigable waters was a tributary within the
Corps' jurisdiction, holding that the distinction between man-made and
natural watercourses is "irrelevant" given that both types can serve as a

356. E.P.A. Docket No. CW A-9-99-0008, 72 (EPA June 10, 2002), 2002 WL 1493840
(hereinafter Veldhuis), available at http://www.epa.gov/oalj/orders/veldhuis.pdf, affd, 2003 WL
23019918 (EPA EAB, Oct.21 , 2003) (CWA Appeal No. 02-08).
357. [d. at 87; see also In re Woleo, Respondent, 2002 EPA AU LEXIS 54 (EPA Sept. 4,
2002) (finding FWPCA jurisdiction where water on respondent's property reached Mississippi
River after traveling across drainage ditch, gravel, pond, stream, tributary of creek, and creek);
Craig, supra note 265, at 8, 13 n.9 (discussing Veldhuis and Wolco).
358. See U.S. v. RGM Corp., 222 F. Supp. 2d 780, 787-89 (E.D.Va. 2002); see also ANPRM,
supra note 6, at 1997.
359. See infra notes 394 and accompanying text.
360. Craig, supra note 265, at 12.
361. United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698 (4'" Cir. 2003), petition for cert. filed, 72 U .S.L.W.
3356 (U.S. Nov. 10,2003) (No. 03-701).
362. Treacy v. Newdunn Assocs., 344 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2003), petition for cerro filed, 72
U.S.L.W. 3310 (U.S. Oct. 27, 2003) (No. 03-637).
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hydrological connection. 363 Rejecting Newdunn's contention that
SWANCC limits the Corps' jurisdiction to wetlands adjacent to navigable
waters, the Fourth Circuit held that "there exists a sufficient nexus
between the Newdunn Wetlands and navigable waters" for the Corps to
assert jurisdiction. 364

B.

Cases Reading the Act Broadly and SWANCC Narrowly

1.
Headwaters: Intermittent Tributaries to Navigable Waters Are Not
Isolated Waters

In Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation District,365 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that irrigation canals were
"waters of the United States" because they were intermittent tributaries
to navigable waters. 366 The defendant, Talent Irrigation District (TID),
operated a system of irrigation canals that provided water to its members
from May to October, and used an aquatic herbicide, Magnacide H, to
control the growth of aquatic weeds in the canals. 367 The Headwaters
organization and another environmental group whose members used the
streams near the irrigation canals filed a citizens' suit under the Act
claiming that TID had violated the FWPCA by discharging aquatic
herbicides into irrigation canals without the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permit required under the Act. 368 The
plaintiffs alleged that the herbicide periodically flowed from the canals
into the navigable Bear Creek through a malfunctioning waste gate,369
and had in fact killed more than 92,000 steelhead in Bear Creek. 370
The Ninth Circuit determined that SWANCC's holding that the
FWPCA jurisdiction does not include isolated waters did not apply to the
canals because intermittent tributaries of navigable waters are not
isolated waters. 371 The Headwaters court read the Supreme Court's
decision to exclude intrastate '''isolated waters'" that have "no
connection to any navigable waters" from the Act's jurisdiction over
"waters of the United States.,,372 But in this case, the court found that the
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.

Id.at416-17.
Id. at 415 n.5, 416-18.
243 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 2001).
See id. at 533-34; Calderon, supra note 8, at 316; Hull, supra note 44.
Headwaters, 243 F.3d 526, 528.
Id. at 528-29.

3(i9.
370.

Id.
Id. at 528.

371. Id. at 533.
372. See id.; Hull, supra note 44, at 436 ("The Ninth Circuit decided Headwaters correctly by
maintaining the historically broad jurisdiction of the [FWPCA1 and limiting the reach of
SWANCC to truly isolated intrastate waters.").
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canals were not "isolated waters." Rather, they served as tributaries to
"waters of the United States," because, even though the canals were
separated from natural streams by a system of closed waste gates,
periodic leaks caused the canals to exchange water with several natural
streams and at least one lake, which were clearly "waters of the United
States.,,373 While TID claimed that the canals were a "closed system," the
court concluded that leaks from the canals into the local creeks had killed
fish in 1983 and 1996 and that there was no guarantee there would be no
future leaks despite the defendants' new "protocol" to prevent such
leaks. 374 While the canals only intermittently contributed water to these
navigable waters, the court concluded that such intermittent tributaries
were "waters of the United States" subject to the Act's permit
requirements. 375 Relying on lower court decisions decided before
SWANCC, the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant was required to
obtain an NPDES permit to apply an aquatic herbicide to non-navigable
irrigation canals that intermittently flowed into "waters of the United
States" even if there was no proof that the herbicide actually polluted
navigable waters. 376 The Ninth Circuit's decision in Headwaters suggests
that even infrequent hydrological connections between non-navigable
and navigable waters can, if ecologically significant, render a body of
water an intermittent tributary that constitutes "waters of the United
States. "377
Headwaters does not address SWANCC's apparent requirement that
non-navigable waters share a "significant nexus" with navigable waters in
order to fall within the scope of the FWCPA. 378 To the extent the Ninth
Circuit suggested that any hydrological connection between nonnavigable waters and navigable waters establishes federal jurisdiction,
Headwaters is inconsistent with SWANCC. However, evidence of a
significant connection between the irrigation canals and navigable waters
justifies the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the canals were within the
FWPCA. Since prior releases of herbicide from the canals had harmed
373. Headwaters, 243 F.3d at 533.
374. fd. at 533-34.
375. Id. at 534. To address continuing controversy arising from Headwaters, the EPA
recently issued guidance that National Pollutant Discharge Elimination (NPDES) Permits under
Section 402 of the FWPCA are generally not required for applications of pesticides regulated
under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), but that states or tribes
may regulates such discharges if they affect water quality. See G. Tracy Mehan, EPA Assistant
Administrator for Water & Stephen L. Johnson, EPA Assistant Administrator for Prevention,
Pesticides and Toxic Substances, Interim Statement & Guidance on Application of Pesticides of
the Waters of the United States in Compliance with FIFRA (July 11, 2003), reprinted 68 Fed.
Reg. 48,385 (Aug 13, 2003).
376. Headwaters,243 F.3d at 534.
377. See Liebesman & Turner, supra note 36, at 213.
378. See SWANCC, supra note 2, at 167; supra notes 225-29 and infra notes 505-22, 549,
554-57 and accompanying text.
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fish in navigable waters, the court was correct to place the burden of
proof on TID to establish that leaks could not occur in the future. TID
failed to meet this burden. 379
If an intermittent tributary is capable of seriously affecting navigable
waters, the FWPCA's fundamental goal of preventing pollution to
navigable waters argues for treating such a tributary as "waters of the
United States.,,380 The Ninth Circuit correctly stated that "[t]he [FWPCA]
is concerned with the pollution of tributaries as well as with the pollution
of navigable streams, and 'it is incontestable that substantial pollution of
one not only may but very probably will affect the other."'381 Previous
decisions had correctly held that normally dry creeks and arroyos that
connect to streams during intense rainfall are "waters of the United
States" because they can substantially affect navigable waters, even if
they only do so infrequently.382 The Headwaters court correctly concluded
that the canals were within the FWPCA because the herbicide's potential
harm to fish established a significant connection to navigable waters. But
the court would have done better by framing its holding as consistent
with the SWANCC significant nexus test, thus emphasizing that
insignificant connections between navigable and non-navigable waters
will not establish jurisdiction under the FWPCA.

2. Lamplight Equestrian Center Allows Jurisdiction Whenever a
"Significant Nexus" Between Intrastate Waters and Navigable Waters
Exists
Several district court decisions have reached a conclusion similar to
the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Headwaters, suggesting that any hydrological
connection between non-navigable and navigable waters is sufficient to
establish jurisdiction under the FWPCA consistent with SWANCC. In
United States v. Lamplight Equestrian Center,383 the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois agreed with the hydrological
connection and nexus approach used in Headwaters - tributaries are not
isolated if they exchange waters with natural streams that are navigable
or connected to navigable waters. 384 The case involved a fifty-two-acre
tract of land, which included approximately eight acres of wetlands. 38s
The landowner placed sand and clay fill for a road in some of the
379. See Liebesman & Turner, supra note 36, at 213.
380. Headwaters, 243 F.3d at 534; see Liebesman & Turner, supra note 36, at 213.
381. Headwaters, 243 F.3d at 534 (quoting United States v. Ashland Oil and Transp. Co., 504
F.2d 1317, 1329 (6th Cir. 1974)); see Liebesman & Turner, supra note 36, at 213.
382. See, e.g., Quivira Mining Co. v. EPA, 765 F.2d 126, 130 (10th Cir. 1985): United States
v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1181, 1187 (D. Ariz. 1975).
383. 2002 WL 360652, 54 ERC 1217, 32 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,526 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
384. [d. at *5.
385. [d. at *1.
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wetlands without obtaining a permit from the Corps.386 The Corps argued
that the wetlands were within its jurisdiction and subject to permit
requirements because they drained into Brewster Creek, which in turn is
connected to the navigable Fox River. 387 The landowner claimed that the
wetlands were isolated and outside its jurisdiction in light of SWANCC. 388
The Lamplight court examined several district court decisions that
had followed the Ninth Circuit approach and found that "[aJt least six
lower courts, including two in th[ e SeventhJ Circuit, have followed
Headwaters' lead in declining to read SWANCC as a broad reduction of
the Corps' authority to regulate waters under the Act."389 The Lamplight
court agreed with Headwaters and the subsequent district court cases that
SWANCC set aside the Migratory Bird "Rule," but did not effect so
substantial a change in the Corps' jurisdiction. The court distinguished
SWANCC on its facts, finding that the waters in SWANCC were "lacking
a physical/hydrological connection to other navigable waters. "390 The
"critical issue" for the Lamplight court was whether there was a
"significant nexus" between the Property's wetlands and the Fox River. 391
The Lamplight court concluded that the hydrological connection
between the wetlands at issue and a tributary to a navigable water was
enough to place the wetlands within the scope of the Act, even though
the connection was intermittent and the tributary itself was not
navigable. 392 The defendant had conceded that a hydrologic connection
existed after rain events and during certain (presumably wet) seasons. 393
Following Headwaters, the district court concluded that "[wJater need not
flow in an unbroken line at all times to constitute a sufficient connection
to a navigable water or its tributaries; as recognized by other courts,
intermittent flow of the type Lamplight has acknowledged can be
sufficient to establish the Corps' jurisdiction.,,394 Additionally, the court
found that a connection between the wetlands and the tributary of
Brewster Creek established "adjacency." The court held that "by virtue
of the path of water, whether it be a delta, a meandering swale, or a
drainage connection the wetlands come into actual contact with the
tributary of the creek." 395

386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.

Id.
[d.
Id.
[d.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at *1-2.
at *1.
at *6.
at *7.

at *8.
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Furthermore, the Lamplight court concluded that it did not matter
whether the creek was navigable, as long as the creek was connected to
navigable waters. The district court explained that:
a tributary need not have a direct connection to the navigable water,
but may be linked through other connections two or three times
removed from the navigable water and still be subject to the Corps'
jurisdiction .... Even where the distance from the tributary to the
navigable water is significant, the quality of the tributary is still vital
to the quality of the navigable waters. 396
While acknowledging that the Fifth Circuit in Rice, at least in dicta,
had taken a broader view of SWANCC, the Lamplight court implied that
the facts in Rice were quite different and distinguishable from its case
"because there was evidence only of oil discharge onto dry land rather
than into any body of surface water."397 To the extent that Rice was
relevant, it represented a minority interpretation among lower federal
courts. The Lamplight court observed
that the remainder of courts considering the issue have reached the
opposite conclusion: that SWANCe struck the Migratory Bird Rule,
pushing "isolated waters' that may affect interstate commerce out of
the Corps' jurisdiction, without altering the Corps" reach where its
jurisdiction is based on a water's use or potential use as a channel of
interstate commerce. 39B
While the district court in Lamplight correctly ruled a tributary need
not have a direct connection to navigable waters, it failed to provide a
clear test for how significant an indirect connection must be in order to
trigger FWPCA jurisdiction. 399 The district court correctly stated that a
significant nexus was required under SWANCe, but again it failed to
quantify the connection between the wetlands and the navigable waters,
or discuss how the non-navigable waters at issue might significantly
impact navigable waters. The Lamplight court should have addressed not
just whether there was a connection between the wetlands and the
navigable waters, but whether the connection was significant.
3.
Buday and Rapanos Allow Jurisdiction in Cases Involving Pollution
into Tributaries or Wetlands that Reach Navigable Waters

In United States v. Buday,4OO the United States District Court for the
District of Montana held that the Corps had jurisdiction to regulate the
discharge of pollutants into tributaries of navigable waters and wetlands

396.
397.
398.
399.

/d.
/d. at *5.
[d.
[d. at *6-7.

400.

138 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (D. Mont. 2001).
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adjacent to such tributaries as "waters of the United States," even though
the creek and surrounding wetlands were not navigable and did not
connect with navigable waters for at least 235 miles. In Buday, the
defendant pled gUilty to knowingly discharging pollutants, including
dredge and fill material, into navigable waters in violation of the
FWPCA. 4OI The defendant entered his guilty plea just hours before the
Supreme Court decided SWANCC. 402 In ruling on the defendant's motion
to withdraw his guilty plea, the district court concluded that the Supreme
Court's decision in SWANCC did not affect cases involving pollution into
tributaries or wetlands that eventually reached navigable waters. The
SWANCC Court had rejected the Migratory Bird "Rule" because it
focused on the possible effects non-navigable waters could have on
interstate commerce, which are open-ended and often unrelated to
navigation. This is in contrast to the traditional focus on whether waters
served as navigable channels for commerce. The court found that the
Migratory Bird "Rule" was "based on a different inflection of the theory
of Congress' powers over the waters of the United States."403
In denying the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the
court concluded that the creek was a tributary to navigable waters and
therefore the wetlands next to the creek were "waters of the United
States. ,,404 The court emphasized that the defendant knew that he needed
a permit from the Corps to do excavation work in a wetlands area and
had agreed that the creek was a "navigable water" within the meaning of
the FWPCA.405 The district court reached the right result. If the guilty
plea had been entered after SWANCC, however, the district court would
have had to consider whether the wetlands and Fred Burr Creek had a
"significant nexus" with a navigable water that was over two hundred
miles away.
Likewise, the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Rapanos recently
reinstated the conviction of a landowner who illegally discharged material
into a wetland based on the potential pollution of a navigable-in-fact
waterway.406 The court determined that direct adjacency between the
wetland and navigable water was not required because contamination of
Rapanos' wetland could affect the navigable waterway through a
hydrological connection between the two water bodies. 407

401. 'd. at 12R4.
402. [d.
403. [d. at 1287.
404. [d. at 1291-95.
405. 'd. at 1284.
406. United States v. Rapanos, 339 F.3d 447 (6th Cir. 2003), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Dec.
22,2003) (No. 03-929).
407. /d.
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The procedural posture of the case is intricate. The defendant in
Rapanos owned 175 acres of land, about one-third of which were
wetlands, located about twenty miles from a bay and navigable section of
a river. 408 Seeking to improve the property for sale, the defendant used
sand to fill in the wetlands, without obtaining a permit from the Corps.409
The government prosecuted him for violating the FWPCA.41O In 1995, a
jury convicted the defendant of two counts of knowingly discharging
pollutants into waters of the United States without a permit, in violation
of Section 301(a) of the Act. 411 The district court sentenced the defendant
to three years' probation and a fine of $185,000.412 The defendant
appealed his conviction and the government cross-appealed his
sentence.413 The Sixth Circuit agreed with the government that the district
court improperly sentenced the defendant and remanded the case for resentencing, and simultaneously summarily dismissed the defendant's
appeal. 414 After the Sixth Circuit decided the case, the Supreme Court
issued its SWANCC decision. The Supreme Court granted the
defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari, vacated the court of appeals'
order, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of SWANCC. 415
The Sixth Circuit remanded the case to the district court. 416 The district
court interpreted the SWANCC decision to require that wetlands be
directly adjacent to navigable waters in order to fall under the FWPCA,
and therefore reversed Rapanos' conviction. In a recent decision, the
Sixth Circuit reinstated Rapanos' conviction.
Even after SWANCC, the government argued that the wetlands
were "waters of the United States" because they constituted a
"tributary.,,417 The government argued that the wetlands were connected
to navigable waters by a "surface hydrological connection," made up of
an open drain sluice, or ditch, connected to a creek that in turn was
connected to the navigable Kawkawlin River. 41R The government argued
that the wetland's hydrological connection to the Kawkawlin River
placed the wetlands within the jurisdiction of the ACt. 419

408.

United States v. Rapanos, 190 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1012 (E.D. Mich. 2002), rev'd, 339 F.3d

447 (6"' Cir. 2003), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Dec. 22, 2003) (No. 03-929).

409.

Id.

410.

[d.
[d.
[d. at 1013.

411.
412.
413.

414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.

Id.
See United States v. Rapanos, 235 F.3d 256, 261 (6th Cir. 2000).
Rapanos, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 1013.
See United States v. Rapanos, 16 Fed, Appx. 345 (6th Cir. 2001).
Rapanos, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 1013-14,
[d. at 1014-15.
Id.
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The Sixth Circuit rejected the district court's finding that SWANCC
requires direct adjacency.42o The lower court commented in a footnote
that frequently "even the most 'isolated' wetlands are in fact both
hydrologically connected, as well as ecologically connected, to navigable
waters," but that SWANCC still treated them as "isolated" and outside
the scope of the Act if the connection was indirect or remote. 421 The Sixth
Circuit, however, took a much more narrow view of SWANCC. While the
Sixth Circuit agreed that the SWANCC opinion "limits the application of
the Clean Water Act," it found that SWANCC "did not go as far as
Rapanos argues."422 Rather it characterized the SWANCC decision as
primarily invalidating the Migratory Bird "Rule."423
The Sixth Circuit in Rapanos also found the rationale of Riverside
Bayview and Deaton more compelling and factually similar to Rapanos
than SWANCC was. 424 Drawing on the Riverside Bayview Court's view
that the Act regulates some non-navigable waters to prevent the
pollution of navigable waters, the district court acknowledged that a
hydrological connection was sometimes enough to show the potential of
non-navigable water to pollute navigable waters. 425 The district court,
nevertheless, distinguished Riverside Bayview by observing that the
wetlands in Riverside Bayview were directly adjacent to navigable waters,
while the wetlands in Rapanos were not adjacent to navigable waters. 426
The Sixth Circuit, however, rejected the requirement of direct adjacency,
finding that so long as a hydrological connection existed and pollution
could potentially travel from the wetland to the navigable water, the
adjacency requirement is met.
While the district court made much of the United States' inability to
provide evidence that the defendant's activities in Rapanos had a direct
impact on navigable waters,427 the Sixth Circuit was not so hamstrung. In
United States v. Ashland Oil and Transp. Co. ,428 the Sixth Circuit
concluded that the defendant violated the FWPCA by releasing 3,200
gallons of oil into a non-navigable tributary located one hundred feet
from a creek that flowed into a navigable river where the oil created a
visible sheen in the creek.429 By contrast, there was no similar evidence in
Rapanos. The district court found that "the plain text of the statute
420. United States v. Rapanos, 339 F.3d 447, 452-53 (6th CiT. 2003), peri/ion for cerro filed,
(U.S. Dec. 22, 2003) (No. 03-929).
421. See Rapanos, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 1014 n.3; Liebesman & Turner, supra note 36, at 212.
422. Rapanos, 339 F.3d at 452-53.
423. See id. at 452-53.
424. /d.
425. See Rapanos, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 1016; Liebesman & Turner, supra note 36, at 211-12.
426. Rapanos, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 1016.
427. /d.
428. 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974).
429. See id. at 1319-25.
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mandates that navigable waters must be impacted by [d]efendant's
activities."43o The court found "as a matter of law, that the government is
unable to prove that [d]efendant, whose land contained wetlands that are
located roughly twenty miles from the nearest body of navigable water,
affected any navigable waters.,,431
As the Sixth Circuit found, the district court was wrong as a matter
of law to require evidence of actual impacts on navigable waters in
addition to a hydrological connection. If a clear hydrological connection
exists, the government should not have to prove an impact on navigable
waters. The 1972 Act sought to eliminate the requirement in earlier
versions of the Federal Water Pollution Act that the government prove
that a water discharge caused harm. 432 Furthermore, as Part VI will
demonstrate, Riverside Bayview did not require adjacent wetlands to
actually abut navigable waters; wetlands are considered "adjacent" if they
have hydrological connections to the navigable waters and are m
reasonable proximity to those navigable waters.433
While the district court was wrong to demand direct evidence of
harm to navigable waters, the court had some legitimate concerns about
whether the hydrological connection between the wetlands and navigable
waters constituted a "significant nexus," given the twenty-mile distance
between the wetlands and the navigable waters. As discussed in Part VI,
while adjacent wetlands need not abut navigable waters, the Corps
regulations appropriately require that wetlands "neighbor" navigable
waters. 434
Several courts concluded that the FWPCA's jurisdiction includes
wetlands that are adjacent to non-navigable tributaries and the
government might have been able to establish jurisdiction on this basis. 435
The district court acknowledged that the government might have tried to
prove that the wetlands were adjacent to non-navigable tributaries that
flowed into navigable waters. However, the district court claimed that the
jury instructions during the trial, which occurred before the SWANCC
decision, did not clearly distinguish jurisdiction based on such an
adjacency from jurisdiction over totally isolated wetlands. 436 The district
court stated: "Thus, while the jury could have found that the wetlands on
430. Rapanos, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 1017.
431. /d.
432. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. CiT. 1978) (rejecting paper mills'
argument that EPA should consider receiving water quality in setting effluent standards because
1972 Act was based on new approach, rejecting earlier versions of Federal Water Pollution
Control Act that required government to prove discharger harmed water quality).
433. See supra notes 162-165, 174, 296-300 and infra notes 531-35, 550 and accompanying
text.
434. See supra notes 171-72 and infra notes 533-36 and accompanying text.
435. See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
436. See Rapanos, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 1014.
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[d]efendant's property were adjacent to a tributary, such a finding was
not necessary; indeed, it is possible under these instructions that the jury
found the wetlands at issue to be completely 'isolated' from any navigable
waters, yet still impacted interstate commerce."437 Because the case was
tried in 1995 before SWANCC limited the FWPCA's jurisdiction, it is not
surprising that the jury instructions, which the government and defendant
agreed to, did not exclude jurisdiction over isolated waters. 438 In future
cases, if wetlands are a significant distance from navigable waters, courts
should examine whether the wetlands are nevertheless adjacent to a nonnavigable tributary that flows into navigable waters.

4. Brace Identifies the Key Issue Under SWANCC as Whether a Nexus
Exists Between Wetlands and an Interstate Channel
In Brace v. United States,439 the United States Court of Federal
Claims addressed a property owner's claim that the government
effectively took his property without just compensation when the Corps
ordered him to stop maintenance and operation of a drainage system on
his property and to restore part of the property to wetland status. 440 The
court denied the government's summary judgment motion on the takings
claim because triable issues existed as to whether the property and an
interstate water shared a significant nexus. 441 Citing the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Headwaters, the Brace court correctly noted that the key
factual question under SWANCC is whether a nexus between wetlands
and an interstate channel exist. 442 In the absence of a nexus, the Corps
lacks jurisdiction over the wetlands. 443 The Brace court correctly
recognized that the nexus issue was central to determining the Corps'
jurisdiction under the FWPCA.
5. California Sportfishing and Bosma: Underground Pipes and
Groundwater
In Rice, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the defendant's disposal of
oil on dry land, which then contaminated groundwater and possibly
reached navigable waters, was outside the Act because the FWPCA's
jurisdiction did not reach groundwater. 444 However, two district court
decisions have found that subsurface waters are within the jurisdiction of

437.
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.

Id.
ld. at 1014 & n. 4.
51 Fed. Cl. 649 (2002).
ld. at 650; see also Brace v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 272 (2000).
Brace, 51 Fed. Cl. at 653.
/d. at 652-53.
/d. at 653.
See supra notes 312-27 and accompanying text.
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the Act if evidence indicates that they are contaminating navigable
waters. 445 And unlike Rice, in which there was mere speculation that the
oil on the ranch actually reached navigable waters,446 the evidence of
contamination in California Sportfishing was far stronger.
In California Sportfishing Protection Alliance v. Diablo Grande,
Inc.,447 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California followed the Ninth Circuit's Headwaters ruling that nonnavigable tributaries are waters of the United States. 448 In California
Sportfishing, the defendant argued that Salado Creek, a non-navigable
tributary to a navigable water, could not be a "navigable water" because
it flowed through an underground pipeline on its way to the San Joaquin
River. 449 The defendant contended that the case was factually closer to
Rice than to Headwaters. 45o
The California Sportfishing court distinguished Rice on two grounds.
First, in Rice "there was no evidence of any discharge into any surface
water; the allegation was that oil seeped into the ground, mixed with
groundwater, and then made its way into several bodies of surface
water."451 By contrast, in California Sportfishing elevated turbidity levels
indicated direct discharge into surface waters. Second, unlike in Rice, the
connection to the navigable water was uncomplicated and direct, and no
groundwater was involved.452 The court did not have to decide whether
groundwater was within the confines of the Act, because "[t]he fact that
the waters of Salado Creek flow underground, partially through a pipe,
does not make them 'groundwater' outside the jurisdiction of the Act.,,453
Unlike Rice, where there was no clear evidence of a hydrological
connection between the groundwater and the river,454 here, there was no
dispute that, at times, water in Salado Creek flows into the San Joaquin
River. Thus, the California Sportfishing decision convincingly
distinguished the Rice decision. Courts should find a significant nexus
where non-navigable waters have a clearly perceptible impact on
navigable waters or where non-navigable waters could have a measurable
impact on navigable waters in the future. 455

See infra notes 446-74 and accompanying text
See supra notes 322-26 and accompanying text.
209 F. Supp. 2d 1059 (E.D. Cal. 2002).
448. [d. at 1075.
449. Id.
450. Jd. at 1075-76.
451. Id. at 1076 (citing Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264, 270 (2001).
452 Id. at 1076.
453. Id. at 1076 (footnote omitted).
454. See Rice, 250 F.3d at 272.
455. See supra notes 359-61, 389-96. 425 and infra notes 521-23 536-42, 549, 554-58 and
accompanying text.
445.
446.
447.
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Even if the tributary in California Sportfishing had been
characterized as groundwater, the tributary may still have been a
navigable water under the FWPCA. 456 The United States District Court
for the District of Idaho in Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma held that the
FWPCA's legislative history only requires exclusion of isolated
groundwater that has no hydrological connection to surface waters. 4S7 In
Bosma, the plaintiffs, Idaho Rural Council, a non-profit representing
various family farmers, brought a citizens' suit under the Act alleging that
the defendant Bosma had dumped waste from its dairy farm into holding
ponds and irrigation canals that seeped into groundwater and surface
waters. 4S8 The Idaho district court concluded that the defendants had
violated the Act by dumping pollutants into two springs, Butler and
Walker Springs that were "sufficiently connected through surface water
to Clover Creek as to fall within the definition of waters of the United
States."459
The district court next addressed "[t]he more difficult issue" of
whether the defendant's "alleged discharge of pollutants into
groundwater that was hydrologically connected to the springs violated the
[FWPCA].,,460 If groundwater is not hydrologically connected to surface
water, courts "generally agree that waters of the United States do not
include isolated, non-tributary groundwater, and that discharges of
pollutants into such groundwater are not subject to [FWPCA]
regulation.,,461 On the other hand, "[t]he courts are split, ... on the issue
of whether the discharge of pollutants into groundwater which find their
way into and affect the waters of the United States are subject to
[FWPCA] regulation.,,462 Neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth
Circuit, the circuit in which the Idaho district court is located, had
addressed the issue directly.463 The Bosma court found that since the goal
of the FWPCA was to protect surface waters, it didn't matter whether the
pollutant entered such waters directly or through groundwater. 464
Conversely, many other courts read the Act's legislative history to
exclude groundwater. 465 These courts point out that the statute expressly
456. See infra notes 457-74 and accompanying text.
457. 143 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1179 (D. Idaho 2001).
458. Id. at 1173--74.
459. Id. at 1178--79.
460. Id. at 1179.
461. Id.; see generally Quatrochi, supra note 314, at 643 (stating "[a]lthough it may be
arguable that non tributary groundwater is covered by the [FWPCA], the Tenth Circuit only
includes tributary groundwater [which is defined as water that reaches surface waters] ").
462 Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1179.
463. Id ..
464. Id. at 1179-80.
465. Id. at 1180 (citing Vill. of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24 F.3d 962 (7th
Cir. 1994)); Town of Norfolk v. Corps of Eng'rs, 968 F.2d 1438, 1451 (1st Cir.1992); Umatilla
Waterquality Protective Assoc., Inc. v. Smith Frozen Foods, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1312,1318 (D. Or.
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included groundwater in certain provisions of the Act, indicating that
Congress distinguished groundwater from navigable waters. 4tJ6
Additionally, Congress was reluctant to regulate groundwater because
states defined the term differently, rendering national legislation
difficult. 467 Furthermore, the EPA has not sought to regulate groundwater
consistently.468 In Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson
Corp.,469 the Seventh Circuit argued that the Act should not include
groundwater because all groundwater eventually reaches surface water,
and the legislature never intended the Act to reach every drop of water at
every point of the hydrologic cycle. 470
While acknowledging that there were arguments against regulating
groundwater under the Act, the Bosma court read the Act's legislative
history to "extend[] federal jurisdiction over groundwater that is
hydrologically connected to surface waters that are themselves waters of
the United States."471 The court therefore denied the defendant's motion
for summary judgment that argued that groundwater is simply beyond
the Act's jurisdiction. 472 However, the court held that the plaintiff has the
burden of demonstrating that polluted groundwater actually reaches
navigable waters. 473 The court found that in meeting that burden, it would
be insufficient "to assert a general hydrological connection between all
waters."474 The court required plaintiffs to trace pollutants from their
source to the surface waters in question. 475
As the Bosma court recognized, whether Congress intended to
include groundwater within the FWPCA's jurisdiction is ambiguous. 476
Under the Chevron doctrine, courts defer to an agency's expertise in
1997); Kelley v. U.S., 618 F. Supp. 1103, 1106 (W.D. Mich. 1985»; see Quatrochi, supra note 314,
at 626-32 (discussing Seventh Circuit's view that groundwater is not within FWPCA's
jurisdiction ).
466. Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1180 (citing Umatilla, 962 F. Supp. at 1318).
467. ld. at 1180 (citing Umatilla, 962 F. Supp. at 1318); see S. REP. No. 92-414 (1971),
reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3739; Vill. of Oconomowoc Lake, 24 F.3d at 965;
Quatrochi, supra note 314, at 615-16,632.
468. Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1180 (citing Umatilla, 962 F. Supp. at 1318); see Vill. of
Oconomowoc Lake, 24 F.3d at 965~6 (observing that EPA has never directly regulated
groundwater and that any indirect regulation is not a basis for finding jurisdiction under the
Act); see also Quatrochi. supra note 314, at 631.
469. Viii. of Oconomowoc Lake, 24 F.3d at 962.
470. [d. at 964-65; Quatrochi, supra note 314, at 631.
471. Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1180.
472. ld. at 1180-81.
473. [d.
474. Id. (citing Washington Wilderness Coalition v. Hecla Mining Co., 870 F. Supp. 983, 990
(E.D. Wash. 1994».
475. Id. at 1180-81.
476. See Thomas L. Casey, HI, Comment. Reevaluating "Isolated Waters": Is Hydrologically
Connected Groundwater "Navigable Water" Under the Clean Waler Act?, 54 ALA. L. REV. 159,
160-74 (2002) (arguing statute and legislative history of Clean Water Act are ambiguous
regarding whether statute includes groundwater hydrologically connected to surface waters).
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addressing ambiguous statutory issues. 477 If the Corps or the EPA issues a
revised guidance or rule that addresses groundwater, courts should defer
to the agencies' interpretation of whether groundwater is within the
scope of the Act.
VI. FEDERAL GUIDANCE IN THE WAKE OF SWANCC

A.

Advance Notice of Proposed Rule Making

In anticipation of issuing a revised guideline or rule to address their
jurisdiction over "waters of the United States" under the Act, the EPA
and the Corps published an Advance Notice of Proposed Rule Making
(ANPRM), which requested public comment on the impact of SWANCC
on the Act's jurisdiction. The agencies specifically solicited comment
from the public on the following two issues:
(1) Whether, and, if so, under what circumstances, the factors listed in
33 CFR 328.3(a)(3)(i)-(iii) (Le., use of the water by interstate or
foreign travelers for recreational or other purposes, the presence of
fish or shellfish that could be taken and sold in interstate commerce,
the use of the water for industrial purposes by industries in interstate
commerce) or any other factors provide a basis for determining
[FWPCA] jurisdiction over isolated, intrastate, non-navigable waters?
(2) Whether the regulations should define "isolated waters," and if so,
what factors should be considered in determining whether a water is
or is not isolated for jurisdictional purposes?478
The agencies requested that commenters "provide, as appropriate,
any information (e.g., scientific and technical studies and data, analysis of
environmental impacts, effects on interstate commerce, other impacts,
etc.) supporting your views, and specific recommendations on how to
implement such views.,,479 The agencies also invited commenters to
submit their "views as to whether any other revisions are needed to the
existing regulations on which waters are jurisdictional under the
[FWPCA]. "480
Consistent with the January 19, 2001 joint memorandum, the
ANPRM persuasively contended that the SWANCC decision has
implications beyond the Section 404 wetlands program and "may also
affect the scope of regulatory jurisdiction under other provisions of the
[FWPCA], including programs under sections 303, 311, 401, and 402,"
that use the phrase "waters of the United States.,,481 The ANPRM

477.
478.
479.
480.
481.

See supra notes 256, 263 and accompanying text.
ANPRM. supra note 6, at 1994.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1993. The ANPRM summarizes these sections as follows:
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observed that "[t]he SWANCC decision also highlights the role of States
in protecting waters not addressed by Federal law. Prior to SWANCC,
fifteen States had programs that addressed isolated wetlands."482 The
agencies also noted that several federal programs existed to assist these
state efforts.483 To assess both current state and federal programs, the
agencies solicited comments addressing "the availability and effectiveness
of other Federal or State programs for the protection of aquatic
resources, and on the functions and values of wetlands and other waters
that may be affected by the issues discussed in this ANPRM.,,484 The
notice originally gave the public forty-five days to respond,485 but the
agencies subsequently extended the deadline to April 16, 2003. 486
B.

Joint Memorandum

In its summary, the ANPRM directs "the regulated community" to
"seek assistance from the Corps and EPA, in accordance with the joint
memorandum attached as Appendix A" while the rule making on
SWANCC is pending. 487 It is somewhat unusual for an agency to publish
such a guidance document in the Federal Register because courts treat

• Section 303 water quality standards program. Under this program, States and
authorized Indian Tribes establish water quality standards for navigable waters to
"protect the public health or welfare" and "enhance the quality of water", "taking into
consideration their use and value for public water supplies, propagation of fish and
wildlife, recreational purposes, and agriculture, industrial, and other purposes, and
also taking into consideration their use and value for navigation."
• Section 311 spill program and the Oil Pollution Act (OPA). Section 311 of the
[FWPCA) addresses pollution from both oil and hazardous substance releases.
Together with the Oil Pollution Act, it provides EPA and the U.S. Coast Guard with
the authority to establish a program for preventing, preparing for, and responding to
spills that occur in navigable waters of the United States.
• Section 401 State water-quality certification program. Section 401 provides that no
Federal permit or license for activities that might result in a discharge to navigable
waters may be issued unless a section 401 water-quality certification is obtained from
or waived by States or authorized Tribes .
• Section 402 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permitting
program. This program establishes a permitting system to regulate point source
discharges of pollutants (other than dredged or fill material) into waters of the United
States.
[d.
482

[d. at 1995.

483.
484.
485.

[d.
[d. at 1994.
[d. at 1991.
486. Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the Clean Water Act Regulatory
Definition of Waters of the United States, 68 Fed. Reg. 9613 (Feb. 28, 2(03); see also EPA,
Clean Water Act Definition of "Waters of the United States," at http://www.epa.gov/owow/
wetlandslswanccnav.html#extension (last updated May 8, 2(03).
487. See ANPRM, supra note 6.
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such documents as only tentative guidance to agency staff rather than
legally binding on the public,488 but the quotation in the preceding
sentence suggests that the agencies intended the joint memorandum to
provide guidance as well to the regulated community until the agencies
issue a more definitive rule or decision on the Act's jurisdiction. The
agencies' decision to publish the jOint memorandum was a good policy
decision because guidance documents are frequently effectively binding
on the public and therefore agencies should give the public notice of their
existence.489 The joint memorandum, however, does not have legally
binding effect. At the end of the ANPRM as published in the Federal
Register, there is the statement that "[t]he following guidance document
will not appear in the Code of Federal Regulations.,,490
In the January 2003 joint memorandum signed by Robert Fabricant,
the EPA's General Counsel, and Steven Morello, General Counsel,
Department of the Army, the agencies issued "clarifying guidance"
regarding SWANCc. 491 The memorandum reviews and summarizes all
the significant lower court cases decided in 2001 and 2002 interpreting the
Act's jurisdiction in light of SWANCC. 492 It discusses the often-conflicting
views of the lower courts about jurisdiction over adjacent wetlands and
tributaries of various types. While primarily raising questions about the
Act's jurisdiction, the 2003 joint memorandum unsurprisingly prohibits
field staff from asserting FWPCA jurisdiction over non-navigable
intrastate waters where the sole basis for jurisdiction are the factors listed
in the Migratory Bird "Rule."493 SWANCC clearly requires this
prohibition. 494 More importantly, the guidance requires field staff to
obtain "formal project-specific approval" from agency headquarters
before asserting jurisdiction over isolated non-navigable intrastate waters
based on interstate commerce links other than migratory birds, even

488. See generally Am. Hosp. Ass'n Y. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(discussing difference between binding rules and non-binding guidance and interpretive
statements); Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (same).
489. See generally Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances,
Manuals, and the Like-Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public? 41 DUKE L.J.
1311,1328-32,1359-62 (1992) (arguing policy statements should provide only tentative guidance
to agency but are often misused to bind agency staff); Robert A. Anthony & David A. Codevilla,
Pro-Ossification: A Harder Look at Agency Policy Statements, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 667,
676-79 (1996) (arguing that policy statements, while issued tentatively, often acquire binding
status); Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985 DUKE L.J.
381,383-84 (1985) (same).
490. Id. at 1995.
491. ANPRM, supra note 6, at 1995. The joint memorandum is included as Appendix A to
the ANPRM in the Federal Register, available at http:// www.epa.gov!owow/wetlands/
swanccnav.html.
492 Id. at 1995-97.
493. [d. at 1997.
494. SWANCC, supra note 2, at 172-74 (2001); supra note 217 and accompanying text.
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though current regulations allow such jurisdiction. 495 Because the
agencies published the 2003 joint memorandum, the January 2001 joint
memorandum is no longer on the agencies' web sites. The EPA's web site
specifically observes that it does not contain superceded guidance. 496
C. Analysis of ANPRM and Joint Memorandum

By themselves, the ANPRM and 2003 guidance do not significantly
change the substance of the agencies' approach to delineating the Act's
jurisdiction, but they add procedural barriers by requiring agency
headquarters to review field staff decisions. 497 Implying that the agencies
have not significantly changed their approach to the Act's jurisdiction,
Benjamin Grumbles, the EPA deputy assistant administrator for water,
told reporters that the new guidance is "very similar" to the 2001 GuzyAnderson memorandum, although it discusses subsequent judicial
decisions. 498 Indeed, some developers and property rights advocates have
complained that the ANPRM and 2003 guidance do not sufficiently
clarify or restrict the jurisdiction of the agencies over waters. 499
Environmentalists are concerned that the 2003 guidance and
ANPRM will eventually lead to sharp reductions in the agencies'
jurisdiction over isolated wetlands and waters. 5OO Some EPA officials have
acknowledged off the record that requiring approval for field staff
decisions will likely curtail the agencies' jurisdiction and give greater
control to state, local and tribal officials. 501 Significantly, Grumbles told

495. ANPRM, supra note 6, at 1997-98; 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3)(i)-(iii) (2003): Bruninga,
supra note 13, at 140.
496. EPA, Clean Water Act Definition of "Waters of the United States," at
http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/swanccnav.html#extension (last updated May 8,2003).
497. See infra notes 500-501 and accompanying text.
498. Bruninga, supra note 13, at 140 (quoting Benjamin Grumbles, EPA deputy assistant
administrator for water).
499. See Bruninga, supra note 7, at 139 (reporting developers seek consistent definition of
Clean Water Act's jurisdiction because they contend various agency officials have applied
inconsistent approach when issuing); Bruninga, supra note 12, at 140 (reporting National
Association of Home Builder's view that the 2003 guidance does not clarify jurisdiction and
allows agencies to assert jurisdiction over waters that SWANCC does not permit them to
regulate); Allison Freeman & Damon Franz, White House Seeks to Redefine Federal Wetlands
Jurisdiction, 10 LAND LEITER No.9, lan. 16,2003 (quoting Duane Desiderio, vice president for
legal affairs at the National Association of Home Builders, "This is only going to perpetuate the
confusing disarray in the field."); Elizabeth Shogren, EPA to Review Clean Water Act's Scope,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2003, at A12, (stating "Developers and environmentalists expressed
disappointment that the administration's announcement failed to clarify what waters now are
covered by federal law"); EPA Claims Isolated Waters Plans Affirm Strong Agency Oversight,
supra note 21 (reporting unnamed source with the National Association of Home Builders
criticized the 2003 guidance and ANPRM for failing to clarify law).
500. See infra note 503 and accompanying text.
501. Michael Kilian & lulie Deardorff, EPA Softens Protection of Wetlands, CHI. TRIB., lan.
11, 2003, at 1.
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reporters at a January 10, 2003 briefing that the Corps districts only need
to seek headquarters' approval if the districts want to regulate
wetlands. 502 Environmentalists are concerned that the Bush
administration, in keeping with its broader efforts to weaken
environmental protections, will adopt a new rule significantly reducing
the agencies' jurisdiction. In response to these criticisms, Grumbles
claimed that the agencies might retain jurisdiction over wetlands and may
not even issue new regulations; on December 16, 2003, the EPA and the
Corps announced that the agencies would not issue new regulations
significantly restricting their jurisdiction over wetlands, although they will
keep the January 2003 joint guidance in effect until they issue revised
guidance refining the Act's jurisdiction. 503 Grumbles has also downplayed
the authority of the agencies by contending that the agencies are simply
responding to policies outlined in recent judicial decisions. 504
VII. USING SWANCC'S SIGNIFICANT NEXUS TEST TO DEFINE ADJACENT WETLANDS
AND TRIBUTARIES UNDER THE FWPCA

The implications of SWANCC are far more important than its actual
holding, which only expressly rejected the Migratory Bird "Rule" as a
basis for regulating isolated wetlands. 50s While acknowledging that the
Act covers some non-navigable waters, the SWANCC majority
emphasized that navigability remains an important criterion for
determining whether water is within the Act's jurisdiction. 506 In
SWANCC, the Court justified its ruling in Riverside Bayview by
explaining that there "was [a] significant nexus between the wetlands and
'navigable waters. ",507 The SWANCC Court's emphasis on the
"significant nexus" between the adjacent wetlands and navigable waters
suggests that the Court will use that standard in future cases.
The "significant nexus" standard is consistent with judicial
precedent, the Act's legislative history, and both the Corps' and the
EPA's regulations asserting jurisdiction over all non-navigable waters
that impact navigable water. Although neither the Act nor its legislative
history explicitly refer to a "significant nexus" standard or to a
hydrological connection approach,508 a long history of judicial decisions
beginning with Rio Grande in 1899 indicates that federal jurisdiction

502.
503.
Agency
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.

EPA Claims Isolated Waters Plans Affirm Strong Agency Oversight, supra note 21.
See Bruninga, supra note 12, at 140; EPA Claims Isolated Waters Plans Affirm Strong
Oversight, supra note 20; supra note 25 and accompanying text.
See Bruninga, supra note 13, at 140.
See supra notes 3, 8, 217, 304 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 4-5, 222-29,246 and accompanying text.
SWANCC, supra note 2, at 167.
See Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 8, at 11056-57.
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includes non-navigable waters that significantly affect navigable waters. 509
The 1972 Act's legislative history supports this view. 510
Despite its focus on the "significant nexus" standard, the SWANCC
decision does not explain how to apply the standard. 5lI How close must
the hydrological connection be between a non-navigable water and a
navigable one before the former is within the Act's jurisdiction? Several
lower court decisions, including the Ninth Circuit in Headwaters, have
suggested or implied that any hydrological connection between nonnavigable waters and navigable waters is sufficient. 5I2 Conversely, the
Fifth Circuit in Rice and even more clearly in its most recent In re
Needham decision has demanded a much stronger hydrological
connection, perhaps limited to only non-navigable waters directly
adjacent to navigable waters. 513 This Article adopts a middle
interpretation requiring that non-navigable waters have a measurable or
perceptible and potentially significant hydrological impact on navigable
waters. 514
The view that any hydrological connection between non-navigable
waters and navigable waters ~s enough to bring non-navigable waters
within the scope of the Act ignores the "significant" component of
SWANCC's "significant nexus" test. In United States v. Rueth,515 the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana adopted
the broadest possible reading of the "significant nexus" test by
concluding that a single molecule of water flowing from non-navigable
waters to navigable waters was enough to establish a hydrological
connection, and thus gave the federal government jurisdiction over the
non-navigable waters. 516 The court contended that an isolated wetland is
one in which not a drop of water reaches navigable waters, and
distinguished its case from SWANCC. In SWANCC, "a molecule of water
residing in [the] pits or ponds could not mix with molecules from other
bodies of water. ,,517 Thus, there was no connection. In contrast, in the
wetlands at issue in the Rueth case, "water molecules currently present in
the wetlands will inevitably flow towards and mix with water from

509. See supra notes 79-80, 94-104. 106 and accompanying text.
510. See supra notes 108-14, 116-29 and accompanying text.
511. See Calderon, supra note 8, at 313-14.
512. See ANPRM, supra note 6, at 1997; see also Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 8, at
11056-57; supra. notes 378, 383-99 and infra notes 515-18 and accompanying text.
513. See ANPRM, supra note 6, at 1997; see also Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 8, at
11056; supra notes 9, 37-40, 324-25, 345, 349-51 and accompanying text.
514. See supra notes 49-54 and infra notes 515-23, 531-49, 553-58 and accompanying text.
515. 189 F. Supp. 2d 874, 877 (N.D. Ind. 2001). order vacating order in part (2002), affd 335
F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 2003)
516. Id. at 877,885-86.
517. Id. at 877.
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connecting bodies," including navigable waters. 518 The court found "[t]he
relationship between the wetlands and the navigable waterway [was]
direct" because there was a significant nexus between the navigable
waters and the adjacent wetland at issue.519 The defendant appealed the
decision to the Seventh Circuit, which recently affirmed the district
court's decision. 520
The Rueth court's test fails to give sufficient weight to the word
"significant" in the significant nexus test. A mere molecule or drop of
water is not significant. On the other hand, the recently reversed Rapanos
district court decision's requirement that the government prove that a
property owner's activities in wetlands actually harms navigable waters
demanded too much and the Sixth Circuit appropriately rejected the
district court's approach.52i The Corps or the EPA should only have to
prove that a non-navigable water may reasonably have significant impacts
on navigable waters because proving actual significant impacts is often
difficult. The "significant nexus" test does not provide a precise answer to
how closely related non-navigable waters must be to navigable ones to
fall within the Act's jurisdiction, but the standard does suggest that the
Corps, EPA and courts must examine the hydrological connections
between them to determine if significant hydrological impacts exist.
A fair reading of the "significant nexus" test is that the Act's
jurisdiction does not reach isolated waters and wetlands that have no or
only a remote hydrological connection to navigable waters. If there is a
significant hydrological connection between non-navigable waters and
navigable waters, the agencies need not prove as an additional factor
whether the hydrological connection has significant ecological impacts
because the Court in Riverside Bayview implied that potential ecological
or biological impacts from a hydrological connection are enough to
constitute a significant relationship or "nexus" to navigable waters. 522 If
non-navigable waters have an ecological connection to navigable waters
by serving as habitat for migratory birds or other species, but there is no
significant hydrological connection, the SWANCC decision unfortunately
strongly implies that the non-navigable waters are beyond the Act's
jurisdiction. 523 However, if there is some hydrological connection between

S18.

ld.
519. Id. at 877-78.
520. See id. at 889.
521. See United States v. Rapanos, 190 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1017 (2002), rev'd, 339 F.3d 447 (6"
Cir. 2003), petition for cert. filed, (U.s. Dec. 22, 2003) (No. 03-929); supra notes 380--90 and
accompanying text.
522. See supra notes 162-165, 171, 174--175, 296-299 and infra notes 532-38, 551 and
accompanying text.
523. SWANCC, supra note 2, at 167-74; supra notes 222-29 and accompanying text.
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non-navigable waters and navigable waters, then the existence of
ecological connections should be a tie-breaker in close cases.
In FD & P Enterprises v. u.s. Army Corps Engineers,524 the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey rejected both an
overly narrow and an overly broad interpretation of the SWANCC
Court's "significant nexus" standard. 525 The FD & P Enterprises court
stated "a reading of [SWANCC] which would confine [FWPCA]
jurisdiction solely to navigable waters and those waters one step removed
from navigable waters could ultimately serve to undermine the basic
purposes of the [FWPCA]. ,,526 Conversely, an overly broad interpretation
of the Act allowing it to include any non-navigable water with the
slightest hydrological connection was inconsistent with the "significant
nexus" test. The court stated that because SWANCC "has substantially
altered the meaning of 'navigable waters' in the [FWPCA], a 'significant
nexus' must constitute more than a mere 'hydrological connection. ",527
While the FD & P Enterprises court was sympathetic to the defendant
landowners' assertion that wetlands on its property were too low to
"provide any flood storage function" and therefore could not significantly
affect the Hackensack River, the court denied the defendant's motion for
summary judgment because "[t]he Corps has submitted sufficient
evidence such that a reasonable jury could find that the filling of the
wetlands will have a substantial injurious impact upon the chemical,
physical, and/or biological integrity of the Hackensack River.,,528
In deciding the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the FD &
P Enterprises court appropriately deferred to the Corps' assertion that
"given the proximity of the wetlands on the FD & P Property to the
Hackensack River, filling of the wetlands would have an injurious impact
on the river by increasing the sediments and chemicals flowing into the
river."529 The Corps also contended "that because the FD & P Property is
within the 100-year flood plain, the proposed fill will displace flood
storage capacity, increasing the likelihood of rain- induced flooding."530
While the district court implied that it was inclined to agree with the
defendant's argument that the impact of filling the wetlands would not be
substantial, the court found the Corps' claim appropriate for jury
considera tion. 531
524. 239 F. Supp. 2d 509 (D.N.1. 2003).
525. [d. at 513-16.
526. [d. at 515.
527. ld. at 516. But see United States v. Jones, 267 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1360 (M.D. Ga. 2003)
(disagreeing with FD &P Enterprises' substantial nexus test because SWANCC only rejected the
Migratory Bird "Rule" and any other language in that case is "merely dicta.").
528. FD & P Enterprises, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 517.
529. ld.
530.
531.

[d.
[d.
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The Corps, EPA and courts should focus on whether significant
hydrological connections exist between non-navigable waters and
navigable waters, rather than on the physical distance between them.
Some commentators have suggested that wetlands must actually abut a
navigable river to be considered adjacent,532 but the "significant nexus"
standard is consistent with precedent emphasizing the need to consider
all clear hydrological connections between wetlands waters and navigable
waters. Non-navigable waters that do not directly abut navigable waters
often have significant hydrological impacts on navigable waters; Riverside
Bayview and SWANCC appropriately regulate these waters under the
Act. 533 While SWANCC excluded isolated waters that have no significant
nexus with navigable waters, SWANCC did not impose a distance
requirement. 534 In Riverside Bayview, the adjacent wetlands "actually
abut[ted] on a navigable waterway," but the Court emphasized the
hydrological and ecological relationship between the wetlands and
navigable waters, instead of the distance between them. S35 Both federal
agencies and courts should follow the lead of the Riverside Bayview
Court by focusing on the hydrological connections between wetlands and
navigable waters or on ecological functions, such as wetlands' role in
filtering water or providing habitat for the species using the navigable
waters, rather than their adjacency.
To give meaning to the SWANCC Court's significant nexus standard,
it is useful to recognize that there are some differences between adjacent
wetlands and tributaries in how they connect to navigable waters. The
Corps' definition of adjacent wetlands does not use a distance formula,
but instead requires wetlands to "neighbor" navigable waters or nonnavigable tributaries 536 While the district court in Rapanos incorrectly
required the wetlands to be directly adjacent to navigable waters, the
twenty-mile distance in Rapanos was arguably too great for the wetlands
in the case to be "adjacent" to navigable waters. 537 However, as the Sixth
Circuit in its Rapanos decision appropriately recognized, the Act's
jurisdiction should usually include wetlands that are "adjacent" to a nonnavigable tributary that is hydrologically connected to navigable waters

532. See Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 8, at 11057-58; Liebesman & Turner, supra
note 36, at 209-12; supra notes 9, 37-40, 324-25, 349-51, 513, 521 and accompanying text.
533. Kalo, supra note 74, at 1690-91 (arguing that Riverside Bayview allowed regulation of
many waters and wetlands that are not navigable in fact if there is a hydrological connection).
534. See supra notes 228-229, 265-268 and accompanying text.
535. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121,129-35 (1985); supra
notes 162-165, 171, 174-175 433,522 and infra notes 536-38, 551 and accompanying text.
536. See supra notes 171-75 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 176-185 and
accompanying text.
537. See supra notes 408, 434 and accompanying text.
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because such wetlands are likely to affect the water quality of the
tributary, and, in tum, the water quality of the navigable waters. 538
By contrast, for tributaries, the physical distance between nonnavigable and navigable waters is not important. The key issue is whether
a clear and significant hydrological connection exists between tributaries
and navigable waters. In Rice, the Fifth Circuit probably correctly
decided that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that the oil leaking into the
groundwater reached navigable waters. 539 Yet a much longer distance
should not preclude tributary status for non-navigable waters. As the
Ninth Circuit suggested in Headwaters, an intermittent tributary can be
within the scope of the Act if it has periodically contributed significant
amounts of water and may do so in the future. 54o Whether the connection
was man-made or natural should not matter. 541 In Newdunn and RGM,
the district court wrongly ruled it inappropriate to consider artificial
connections or pathways; the Fourth Circuit has reversed Newdunn and
will likely reverse RGM. The court justified its decision based on their
belief that man-made connections are more likely to be blocked or
discontinued in the future. This assumption is false because both artificial
and natural connections can become blocked over time, and thus, the
artificial versus natural distinction is not helpfu1. 542
The SWANCC decision does not directly address the long-standing
issue of whether groundwater connected to surface waters falls within the
Act's jurisdiction. 543 As the split among the lower courts demonstrates,
there are strong arguments on both sides, based on how one reads the
Act's legislative history.544 While SWANCC does not address the issue of
groundwater, its "significant nexus" test is compatible with decisions
concluding that groundwater that has a direct connection to navigable
surface waters falls under the Act's jurisdiction. 545 The "significant nexus"
test could provide a limiting principle for when groundwater falls within
the Act's jurisdiction by excluding trivial or "one drop" connections.
538. See United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding the Corps has
jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to non-navigable drainage ditch, which is eventual tributary
to navigable waters), petition for em. filed, 72 U.S.L.W. 3356 (U.S. Nov. 10.2003) (No. 03-701);
see supra notes 183-85.406-07.420-33 and accompanying text.
539. See supra notes 319-28 and accompanying text.
540. See, e.g., Headwaters v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526, 533 (9th CiT. 2001); United
States v. Interstate Gen. Co., 152 F. Supp. 2d 843, 846-47 (D. Md. 2001); United States v. Krilich.
152 F. Supp. 2d 983, 992 n.13 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F. Supp. 2d
1169,1178 (D. Idaho 2001); United States v. Buday, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1282,1289 (D. Mont. 2001);
Liebesman & Turner, supra note 36, at 212-13; supra notes 44-45, 365-83, 392-94 and
accompanying text.
541. See supra notes 353-57, 361-64 and accompanying text.
542. Id.
543. Id.
544. See supra notes 461-70 and accompanying text.
545. Id.
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While the SWANCC Court refused to defer to the agencies' Migratory
Bird "Rule"546 because the Court concluded that "rule" exceeded the
agencies' statutory authority under the Act,547 there is a much stronger
argument for courts to defer to the agencies' expertise in addressing the
ambiguous statutory issue of whether groundwater is within the scope of
the Act. 548
The significant nexus standard addresses the Act's ultimate goal of
improving the nation's navigable waters by examining whether nonnavigable waters have significant hydrological impacts on navigable
waters. While arguably easier to apply, a test requiring non-navigable
waters to abut navigable waters would exclude too many non-navigable
waters that have significant impacts on navigable waters. On the other
hand, a trivial "one drop" connection between non-navigable waters and
navigable waters is not a significant nexus. To meet the significant nexus
test, non-navigable waters must have a perceptible or measurable impact
on navigable waters to be considered "waters of the United States."
Despite Justice Stevens' 'strong arguments in his SWANCC dissent for an
ecological test, the SWANCC majority does not bring isolated waters that
support migratory birds or other wildlife, but lack a significant
hydrological connection, under the FWPCA's jurisdiction. At most,
ecological impacts could be a tie-breaker in cases where non-navigable
waters have a small, but measurable, impact on navigable waters; such
impacts arguably are significant. 549
CONCLUSION

The SWANCC decision wrongly limited the FWPCA to only
navigable waters and non-navigable waters closely related to navigable
waters. Based on the 1972 Act's legislative history and the apparent
acquiescence of the 1977 Congress to the Corps' newly expanded
regulations, Justice Stevens' dissent persuasively argued that the Act
reaches the limits of Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause.s5o
Additionally, as the Supreme Court recognized in Riverside Bayview, the
1972 Act's legislative history supports a broad reading of the Act's
jurisdiction to achieve the Act's ecological and hydrological goals. 55 ! The
legislative history of the Act and its overall text suggest that Congress
sought to balance state and federal roles, rather than to reserve exclusive

546.
547.
548.
549.

See supra notes 255--{)3 and accompanying text.
/d.

See supra notes 475-77 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 49-54,174-75,179-82,377-82,389-96,425,455,521-23, 534-42 and infra
notes 554-58 and accompanying text.
550. See supra notes 272-95 and accompanying text.
551. See supra notes 162--{)5, 171, 174-75, 296-99, 433, 522, 532-38 and accompanying text.
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state control over isolated wetlands. 552 Finally, scientific evidence
indicates that isolated wetlands and wetlands above headwaters are as
important ecologically as adjacent wetlands. 553 Nevertheless, despite
SWANCC's flawed reasoning, the agencies and lower courts must
appropriately apply its "substantial nexus" standard.
Instead of revising the regulations defining "waters of the United
States," the EPA and the Corps could simply issue guidance that more
clearly explains how field staff should apply SWANCC's "significant
nexus" test. The agencies should issue guidance that protects all nonnavigable waters that have a significant hydrological connection or nexus
to navigable waters, while excluding waters that have a trivial or "one
drop" connection. 554 The Rueth court's ruling that a non-navigable water
lies within the Act's jurisdiction if it contributes one drop to navigable
waters is not a reasonable interpretation of the "significant nexus" test. 555
On the other hand, the recently reversed Rapanos district court decision's
requirement that the government prove that a property owner's activities
in wetlands actually harms navigable waters demanded too much and the
Sixth Circuit appropriately rejected the district court's approach. 556
Accordingly, the Corps and the EPA should have to prove only that a
non-navigable water may reasonably have significant impacts on
navigable waters, because proving actual significant impacts is often
difficult. 557 If non-navigable waters have an ecological connection to
navigable waters by serving as habitat for migratory birds or other
species, but no significant hydrological connection exists, then the nonnavigable waters are regrettably beyond the scope of the Act. However, if
there is some hydrological connection exists, then the existence of
ecological connections should serve as a tie-breaker in close cases.
Applying a reasonable interpretation of the "significant nexus" test to
include all non-navigable waters that have a significant hydrological
connection or nexus to navigable waters is consistent with SWANCC's
demand that the agencies must ultimately base the Act's jurisdiction on a
relationship to navigability. While Justice Stevens' ecologically-based
reading of the Act is preferable in many ways to the majority's significant
nexus test, a liberal yet reasonable application of the significant nexus
test would still protect many non-navigable waters and wetlands. If the

552. See Craig, supra note 32, at 10508-D9, 10519, 10526-27; supra notes 251-55 and
accompanying text.
553. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
554. See supra notes 49-54, 514-23,532-49 and accompanying text.
555. See supra notes 514-21 and accompanying text.
556. See United States v. Rapanos, 190 F. Supp. 2d lUll, 1017 (2002), rev'd, 339 F.3d 447 (6'h
Cir. 2003), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Dec. 22, 2003) (No. 03-929); supra notes 37-40, 407-34,
537-38 and accompanying text.
557. See supra notes 424-33, 455, 522-23, 532-42, 554-56 and accompanying text.
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EPA and the Corps adopt a guidance or rule that fails to include
wetlands, tributaries, and other waters that have significant hydrological
impacts on navigable waters, courts should reject that rule or guidance as
inconsistent with the statute's clear purpose "to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters" for
current and future generations. ss8 Hopefully, the Bush Administration
will maintain its recent decision on December 16, 2003 not to issue a rule
559
restricting the Act's jurisdiction.

558. 33 U.S.c. § 1251(b) (2003).
559

See supra note 25 and accompanying text,
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